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1936.  Determinants  of Transient  Other  policy  instruments  may  be  put effective development policies in place
and Chronic  Poverty:  Evidence  needed  to deal  with  transient  poverty,  is unlikely to oversee the effective use of
from Rural  China  including  seasonal  public works,  credit  foreign aid.
schemes,  buffer  stocks,  and  insurance  On the  other  hand,  there  is a relation-
Jyotsna Jalan  and Martin Ravallion  options  for the  poor.  ship  between  aid  and  a change  in infant
(June  1998)  This paper  - a product  of the Develop-  mortality  when  the recipient  country  has
ment  Research  Group-  is part  of a larger  relatively  good management.  When  man-
Both  chronic and  transient poverty  are  effort  in the  group  to reexamine  the role  agement is good, additional  aid worth  1
reduced by greater command over physi-  of the informal sector. Copies of the paper  percent of GDP has  a powerful effect, re-
cal capital, and life-cycle  effects  for the two  are available  free from the  World Bank,  ducing infant  mortality by 0.9 percent.
types of  poverty are similar. But there the  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  In other words, aid spurs  growth  and
similarities  end. Most policies aimed  at  20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,  improvements  in social indicators only in
reducing chronic poverty may have little  room MC3-632, telephone 202-473-3902,  a good policy environment.
or no effect on transient poverty.  fax 202-522-1153,  Internet address psader  These findings strengthen  the case for
@worldbank.org. The authors  may be con-  targeting  foreign  aid  to countries  that
Are the determinants  of chronic and tran-  tacted  at  jjalan@worldbank.org  or  have improved their economic  policy. But
sient poverty different?  Do policies that  mravallion@worldbank.org. (22 pages)  after controlling for per capita income and
reduce  transient  poverty  also  reduce  population, there has been almost no re-
chronic poverty?  lationship  between  countries'  economic
Jalan  and  Ravallion  decompose mea-  1937.  Aid, the Incentive  Regime,  policies and the  amount  of aid they  get.
sures  of household  poverty  into  chronic  and Poverty Reduction  The relatively  indiscriminate  allocation  of
and  transient  components  and  use  assistance  is one factor undermining  the
censored  conditional  quantile  estimators  Craig Burnside  and David Dollar  potential  impact  of aid.
to  investigate  the  household  and  geo-  (June 1998)  This  paper  -a  product  of Macroeco-
graphic determinants  of both chronic and  nomics  and  Growth,  Development  Re-
transient  poverty, taking  panel  data for  Aid  spurs growth  and poverty reduction  search Group - is part of a larger  effort
post-reform  rural  China.  only  in a good policy environment  so it  in the group to examine aid effectiveness.
They find that  a household's  average  should be targeted to countries that have  The study was funded by the Bank's Re-
wealth holding is an  important  determi-  improved their economic policy. That aid  search Support Budget under the research
nant  for  both  transient  and  chronic  tends to be allocated relatively indiscrimi-  project "Economic Policies and the Effec-
poverty.  nately  is one factor that  undermines  its  tiveness  of Foreign  Aid" (RPO 681-70).
Although  household  demographics,  potential  impact.  Copies ofthis  paper are available  free from
levels  of education,  and  the health  status  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,
of members  of the  household  are  impor-  Spurring  growth  in the  developing  world  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
tant  for  chronic  poverty,  they  are  not  is one stated  objective  of foreign  aid. An-  Emily  Khine,  room  MC3-347,  telephone
significant  determinants  of  transient  other,  more  commonly  cited,  objective  is  202-473-7471,  fax 202-522-3518,  Internet
poverty.  reducing  poverty.  Generally  poverty  re-  address  kkhine@worldbank.org.  The  au-
Both  chronic  and transient  poverty  are  duction  and  growth  go hand  in hand,  but  thors  may  be  contacted  at  cburnside
reduced by greater  command over physi-  could aid mitigate  poverty without mea-  @Cworldbank.org  or  ddollar#worldbank.
cal capital, and life-cycle  effects for  the two  surably  affecting growth?  org. (18 pages)
types  of poverty  are similar.  But there  the  Burnside  and  Dollar  examine  how  for-
similarities  end.  eign  aid  affects  infant  mortality  - an
Smaller  and  better-educated  house-  important  social indicator  that  provides  1938. What Explains  the Success
holds have less chronic poverty, but house-  indirect evidence that  the benefits of de-  or Failure  of Structural  Adjustment
hold size and level of education matters  velopment  are  reaching  people  every-  Programs?
little  for transient  poverty.  Living in an  where.
area  where  health  and education  are bet-  They conclude  that  in developing  coun-  David Dollar and Jakob Svensson
ter  reduces  chronic  poverty  but  appears  tries  with weak  economic management  - (June  1998)
to be irrelevant  to transient  poverty.  Nor  evidenced  by poor  property  rights,  high
are higher foodgrain yields a significant  levels of corruption, closed trade regimes,  A fewpolitical  economy variables can suc-
determinant  of  transient  poverty,  al-  and macroeconomic instability  - there is  cessfully predict the ou  tcome of an adjust-
though they are highly significant  in re-  no  relationship  between  aid  and  the  ment loan 75percent of the time.  To select
ducing chronic poverty.  change in infant  mortality.  In distorted  promising candidates for adjustment,  the
These  findings  suggest  that  China's  environments,  development projects pro-  World Bank must do a betterjob of under-
poor-area  development program  may be  moted by donors tend to fail.  standing which environments arepromis-
appropriate  for reducing chronic poverty  And aid resources are typically fungible,  ing for reform and which are not.  Being
but is unlikely to help reduce variations  so the  aid does not in fact finance these  more selective may mean smaller volumes
in consumption  that  households  typically  projects.  Aid  finances  the  whole  public  of lending.
face  in poor  areas  -the  exposure  to un-  sector  at  the  margin,  which  is  why  the
insured  income  risk  that  underlies  tran-  quality  of management  is the key to effec-  In  the  1980s  development  assistance
sient  poverty  will probably  persist.  tive  assistance.  A government  that  cannot  shifted  largely  from  financing  invest-2  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
ments(suchasroadsanddams)topromot-  1939. Second Thoughts  1940. The Structure of Labor
ing policy reform. This change came be-  on Second Moments: Panel  Markets in Developing Countries:
cause of a growing awareness  that devel-  Evidence on Asset-Based  Time Series Evidence on
oping countries  were held back more by  Models of Currency Crises  Competing Views
poor  policies  than  by a lack  of finance  for
investment.  Arturo J.  Galindo and William F. Maloney  William F. Maloney
After  nearly  20 years'  experience  with  (June  1998)  (June  1998)
policy-based  or conditional  lending,  there
have  now  been  many  studies  of  adjust-  The  evidence  is  broadly  supportive  of  The informal  sector behaves as an unregu-
ment  lending,  most  of which  take  a case-  an  asset  view  of speculative  attacks  and  lated  entrepreneurial  sector  rather  than
study  approach.  Many  conclude  that  the importance  of the variance  ofmonetary  the disadvantaged  segment  of a dual  la-
policy-based  lending  works  if  countries  aggregates  in  predicting  currency  bor market.  Overall,  it expands  in upturns
have  decided  on their  own to reform.  crises,  but  it cast  some  doubt  on existing  and  contracts  in downturns,  though  there
Dollar  and  Svensson  examine  a data-  theories.  is some  evidence  of queuing  to enter  the
base  of 220 World Bank-supported  reform  formal  sector.
programs  to identify  why adjustment  pro-  The  literature  on speculative  attacks  has
grams  succeed  or fail.  been  given new impetus  by the  collapse  of  Competing  conceptions  of the  large,  un-
They  find  that  a few political  economy  the  European  currency  arrangements  be-  protected,  "informal"  workforce  in devel-
variables  can successfully  predict  the out-  ginning  in 1992, by the Mexican  peso crisis  oping  countries  differ greatly  in their  im-
come of an adjustment  loan  75 percent  of  and aftereffects  in 1994, and most recently  plications  for the labor  reform  considered
the  time.  Variables  under  the  World  by speculative  attacks  across  Asia.  to be essential  complements  to trade  lib-
Bank's  control  - resources  devoted  to  One  strand  of this  literature  stresses  eralization  and "fair"  competition  in inter-
preparation  and supervision  or number  of  the  importance  of imbalances  in stocks  of  national  trade.
conditions  -have  no relationship  with an  monetary  and financial  aggregates  rather  Traditionally,  the  informal  sector  is
adjustment  program's  success  or failure.  than  traditional  "flow"  factors,  arguing  viewed  as  the  disadvantaged  segment  of
What  development  agencies  must  do,  that  massive,  volatile  capital  flows  have  a dual  labor  market  segmented  by legis-
then,  is  select  promising  candidates  for  become  a dominant  feature  of the  global  lated  or union-induced  rigidities  and high
adjustment  support.  When  the  candidate  landscape,  and that  exchange-rate  levels  labor  costs  in the  protected  (or "formal")
is a poor selection,  devoting  more  admin-  and current  accounts  have not proved con-  sector.  In this  view,  the  size  of the  infor-
istrative  resources  or imposing  more  con-  vincing  as  proximate  causes  of crises.  mal sector  is a testament  to the  inefficien-
ditions  will not  increase  the  likelihood  of  Galindo  and  Maloney  test  two popular  cies in labor  allocation  and the magnitude
successful  reform.  asset-based  models  of speculative  attacks  of required  reform.  In cyclical downturns,
To improve  its success  rate  with  adjust-  - Krugman  and  Rotemberg  (1992)  and  the  informal  sector  is thought  to absorb
ment  lending,  the  World  Bank  must  be-  Calvo  and  Mendoza  (1995)  - especially  displaced  workers  from  the  formal  sector
come more  selective  and  do a better  job of  their  emphasis  on the  second moments  of  (with informal  earnings  falling  relative  to
understanding  which  environments  are  monetary  aggregates.  those  in  the  formal  sector)  and  then  to
promising  for  reform  and  which  are  not.  Analyzing  monthly  panels  of appropri-  contract  again  during  recovery  as  the
That  is likely  to lead to fewer  adjustment  ate  countries  in  three  regions,  they  find  queue  for "good jobs"  shortens  again.
loans,  unless  there  is a significant  change  evidence  for the  importance  of money/re-  A recent,  related  view postulates  a long-
in the number  of promising  reformers.  To  serve ratios  predicted  by both models,  and  term  trend  in  which  large  enterprises,
become more effective  at supporting  policy  their  variance  as predicted  by Calvo  and  confronted  by heightened  global competi-
reform,  the  agency  must  be willing  to ac-  Mendoza.  tion,  increasingly  subcontracts  to unpro-
cept that  this may lead to smaller  volumes  But  the  variance  of velocity  does  not  tected  workers  as  a way  to reduce  costs
of lending.  appear  to  be  important,  casting  some  and  gain  flexibility.  This  is  particularly
This  paper  - a product  of the  Macro-  doubt  on the  Krugman-Rotemberg  target  relevant  in the debate  about  establishing
economics  and  Growth,  Development  zone framework  and the interpretation  of  common  labor standards  in regional  trade
Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  ef-  the  Calvo-Mendoza  results.  agreements.
fort in the  group to examine  aid effective-  This  paper  - a product  of the  Poverty  Maloney  reexamines  the  traditional
ness.  The study  was funded  by the Bank's  and  Economic  Management  Unit  of the  view of the dual  labor  market  by studying
Research  Support  Budget  under  the  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  Re-  the  dynamics  between  the formal  and  in-
research  project  "Economic  Policies  and  gion-  is part  of a larger  effort  in the  re-  formal  sectors  across  a business  cycle and
the  Effect  of Foreign  Aid" (RPO  681-70).  gion  to understand  the  determinants  of  a period  of trade  liberalization  in Mexico
Copies ofthis  paper  are available  free from  macroeconomic  instability.  Copies  of the  (1987-93).
the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  He  shows  conventional  comparisons  of
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  earnings,  even  across  time,  to be unreli-
Emily  Khine,  room  MC3-347,  telephone  20433.  Please  contact  Marta  Cervantes,  able  tests  for segmentation.  As an  alter-
202-473-7471,  fax 202-522-3518,  Internet  room I8-095, telephone  202-473-7794,  fax  native,  he shows that  transitions  on infor-
address  kkhine@worldbank.org.  The  au-  202-522-0054,  Internet  address  mal  employment,  the  size of the  informal
thors  may  be  contacted  at  ddollar  mcervantes@worldbank.org.  William  sector,  and  levels  of  mobility  to  be
@worldbank.org.  orjsvensson@worldbank.  Maloney  may  be contacted  at  wmaloney  procyclical,  increasing  with  upturns,  and
org. (34 pages)  @worldbank.org.  (27 pages)  decreasing  with  recessions.  He  tests  for,Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  3
and  finds,  however,  some  evidence  of  panel data  from Mexico, and finds little  *  In Eastern  Europe there  is a strong
queuing to enter formal employment.  evidence to support the traditional  dual-  correlation between poverty incidence and
Overall, he contends, the informal sec-  istic view.  the number of children in a household; in
tor behaves as an unregulated  entrepre-  He shows that  traditional  earning dif-  the former Soviet Union countries this is
neurial  sector rather  than  the disadvan-  ferentials  cannot prove or disprove  seg-  less pronounced, except in Russia.
taged wing of a dual labor market.  There  mentation  in  developing countries,  and  *  There is a gender and age dimension
is evidence of increased  subcontracting  patterns ofworker mobility do not suggest  to poverty in some countries.  In single-
over time, with trade liberalization,  but it  a rigid labor market  - or one segmented  person  households, especially of elderly
is not clear that workers  are worse off as  into formal and informal  divisions.  women, the poverty rate is very high (ex-
a result.  It is possible that  the market  is dualis-  cept in Poland) and poverty  is more severe.
This paper  -a  product of the  Poverty  tic in  the  sense  used  in the  industrial  The same is true in pensioner households
and  Economic Management  Unit,  Latin  world, but the division between good  jobs  (except in Poland). In Poland the pension
America and the Caribbean  Region - is  and bad jobs seems to cut across issues of  system has adequate  reach.
part of a larger effort in the region to reex-  formality.  *  Poverty  rates  are  highest  among
amine the role of the informal sector. The  This paper  - a product of the Poverty  people who have lost their connection  with
study was funded by the Bank's Research  and  Economic Management  Unit,  Latin  the labor market  and live on social trans-
Support Budget under the research project  America and  the  Caribbean  Region-  is  fers (other than  pensions)  or other non-
"The  Informal Sector  in Mexico"  (RPO  680-  part of a larger effort in the region to re-  earned income. But through  sheer mass,
59). Copies  of this paper are available free  examine the  role of the  informal  sector.  the  largest  group  of poor people is the
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Copies of  the paper are available free from  working poor - especially workers with
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  little education (primary education or less)
Marta Cervantes, room I8-095, telephone  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  or outdated vocational or technical educa-
202-473-7794, fax 202-522-0054,  Internet  Marta Cervantes, room I8-095, telephone  tion. Only those with special skills or uni-
address  mcervantes@worldbank.org. The  202-473-7794, fax 202-522-0054, Internet  versity education escape poverty in great
author  may  be contacted  at  wmaloney  address mcervantes@worldbank.org. The  numbers, thanks  to the demand for their
@worldbank.org.  (29 pages)  author  may be  contacted  at  wmaloney  skills  from the  newly  emerging  private
@worldbank.org. (34 pages)  sector.
o The  poverty  gap  is  remarkably
1941. Are Labor  Markets  in  uniform in Eastern  European  countries,
Developing  Countries  Dualistic?  1942.  Poverty  Correlates  especially Hungary and Poland, suggest-
and Indicator-Based  Targeting  ing that social safety nets have prevented
William  F. Maloney  in Eastern  Europe  and  the  the emergence of deep pockets of poverty.
(June 1998)  Former  Soviet  Union  This is much less true in the former So-
viet Union, where those with the highest
There is little evidence to support the tra-  Christiaan Grootaert  and Jeanine  poverty rate also have the largest poverty
ditional  dualistic  view of a labor market  Braithwaite  gap.
segmented  between formal and informal  (July 1998)  In the short to medium term, creating
sectors as theprincipalparadigm  through  employment in the  informal  sector will
which to view the informal sector. The di-  Social protection systems in the transition  generate alargerpayoffthan  creatingjobs
vision  between good jobs  and  bad jobs  economies have been inadequate  to meet  in the formal (still to be privatized)  sec-
seems to cut across issues of formality - the  challenges of transition,  being both  tor, so programs to help (prospective) en-
and for many  workers, inefficient  labor  costly  and  poorly  targeted.  The  largest  trepreneurs  should take  center  stage in
codes and low levels of human capital may  group of poor people is the working poor  poverty alleviation  programs.
make employment  in the informal  sector  -especially  workers with little education  This paper is a joint  product of the So-
more desirable.  (primary education  or less) or outdated  cial Development Department and Europe
vocational or technical education.  and Central  Asia, Poverty Reduction and
There is a long tradition  ofviewing as dis-  Economic Management  Sector Unit. The
advantaged  the  roughly  40  percent  of  Grootaert and Braithwaite  compare pov-  study was funded by the Bank's Research
workers in developing countries who are  erty in three Eastern  European countries  Support  Budget  under  the  research
unprotected by labor legislation and work  (Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and  Poland)  with  project "Poverty and Targeting  of Social
in small 'informal"  firms.  poverty in three  countries of the former  Assistance  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the
Maloney offers an alternative  to tradi-  Soviet Union (Estonia, Kyrgyz Republic,  Former Soviet Union" (RPO 680-33).  Cop-
tional views of the relationship  between  and Russia). They  find striking differences  ies of this paper are available free from the
formal and informal  labor markets:  For  between the post-Soviet and Eastern  Eu-  World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-
many  workers,  inefficiencies in present  ropean experiences with poverty and tar-  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Gracie
labor codes and  relatively  low levels of  geting. Among patterns  detected:  Ochieng, room MC5-158, telephone  202-
human  capital  (labor productivity)  may  *  PovertyinEasternEuropeissignifi-  473-1123, fax 202-522-3247, Internet  ad-
make employment in the informal sector  cantly lower than  in former Soviet Union  dress gochieng@worldbank.org. The au-
more desirable.  countries.  thors  may  be  contacted  at  egrootaert
He offers the first study of worker tran-  *  Rural poverty is greater  than  urban  @worldbank.org  or  jbraithwaite
sitions  among  sectors,  using  detailed  poverty.  @worldbank.org. (112 pages)4  Policy Research Working Paper Series
1943. The Implications of  as though  he  were  discounting  the  future  Moreover,  many  countries  have liberal-
Hyperbolic  Discounting  for  ataconstant  exponential  rate.  The indivi-  ized  their  cotton  subsectors,  and in some
Project Evaluation  dual's  consumption  path  is,  however,  countries  the  government's  role  has
Pareto  inferior:  He  would  be  better  off if  changed  substantially.
Maureen Cropper and David Laibson  he could force himself  to consume  less and  In East  Africa,  for example,  cotton  mar-
(July 1998)  save  more.  keting  and trade  was handled  entirely  by
This  provides  a  rationale  for  govern-  government  parastatals.  Now  Tanzania,
There is strong empirical  evidence that  ment  subsidization  of interest  rates  or,  Uganda, and  Zimbabwe have liberalized
people discount the future hyperbolically,  equivalently,  lowering the  required  rate  their  marketing  and  trade  regimes,  to
applying  larger annual  discount rates to  of return  on investment  projects.  varying degrees.
near-term returns  than to returns in the  Although  hyperbolic  discounting  pro-  In the  former Soviet Union (FSU) cot-
distant  future.  The problem  with  hyper-  vides a rationale for lowering the required  ton  shipped  from Central  Asia to other
bolic discounting is that it leads to time-  rate  of return  on investment  projects, it  parts  of the FSU were considered part of
inconsistent plans  -a  person  who dis-  does not providejustification for  those who  domestic trade.  Now cotton exports from
counts the future hyperbolically will not  seek to treat  environmental  projects dif-  Uzbekistan  are the most important  com-
carrv  out the consumptionplans  he makes  ferently from other investment  projects.  ponent of that  country's foreign trade.
today. Hyperbolicdiscountingprovidesa  This paper-  a product of Environment  With such changes, one should expect
rationale for lowering the required rate of  and  Infrastructure,  Development  Re-  cotton prices to converge somewhat more
return on investmentprojects  but does not  search Group - is part of a larger  effort  in the long run.
justify  treating  environmental  projects  in the group to develop benefit-cost meth-  Price  links  between  West Africa and
differently from other investmentprojects.  ods  for environmental  decisionmaking.  Central  Asia  are  much  greater  than
Copies of the paper  are available  free from  between  the  United  States  and  other
The neoclassical  theory  of project  evalua-  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  markets  -in  part  because  most  West Af-
tion  is based  on models  in which  agents  Washington  DC  20433.  Please  contact  rican  and  Central  Asian  cotton  is  ex-
discount  the future  at a constant  exponen-  Anna  Maranon,  room MC2-533, telephone  ported,  compared  with  only 40 percent  of
tial  rate.  But  there  is  strong  empirical  202-473-9074,  fax 202-522-3230,  Internet  U.S.  cotton  (and  60 percent  of Greek  cot-
evidence  that  people  discount  the  future  address  amaranon@worldbank.org.  ton).  Prices  in countries  that  export  most
hyperbolically,  applying  larger  annual  Maureen  Cropper  may  be  contacted  at  of their  cotton  are  more likely  to converge
discount  rates  to near-term  returns  than  mcropper@worldbank.org.  (13 pages)  than  prices  in countries  where  prices  are
to returns  in the  distant  future.  subject  to both domestic  and international
This  has  led  some policymakers  to ar-  demand  conditions.
gue  that,  in evaluating  programs  with  1944.  Detecting  Price  Links  To  improve  price  risk  management,
benefits  spread  over decades  (such  as sub-  in the World Cotton Market  there  should  be  futures  contracts  other
way  systems  and  abatement  of  green-  than  those  traded  on the  New York  Cot-
house  gases),  a  low  long-term  discount  John Baffes and Mohamed I. Ajwad  ton Exchange,  which mostly  serves domes-
rate  should  be used.  In  fact,  some  econo-  (July 1998)  tic U.S. needs  and is not  used  extensively
mists  have suggested  that  higher  discount  by non-U.S.  hedgers  and  speculators.
rates be applied in the present and lower  Links between international  cotton  prices  This paper  -a  product of the Develop-
rates  in the future.  haue improved in the past decade -in  the  ment Research Group -is  part of a larger
Cropper and Laibson demonstrate that  short run largely because prices are now  effort  in  the  group  to  investigate  the
this is incorrect.  transmitted  more quickly.  To a lesser ex-  behavior  of world prices.  Copies of the
The problem with hyperbolic discount-  tent,  and  for  different  reasons,  prices  paper  are available  free from the World
ing is that  it  leads to time-inconsistent  should also converge  somewhat more in the  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,
plans  -a  person who discounts  the future  long run.  DC  20433.  Please  contact  John  Baffes,
hyperbolically  will not  carry  out  the  con-  room  MC3-545,  telephone  202-458-
sumption  plans  he  makes  today.  Baffes  and  Ajwad  examine  the degree  to  1880, fax 202-522-1151,  Internet  address
Cropper  and Laibson  note  that  if social  which  international  cotton  prices  are  jbaffes@worldbank.org.  (36 pages)
decisionmakers  were  to use people's  1998  linked  and  test  whether  such  links  have
hyperbolic  rates  of time preferences,  plans  improved  over the  past  decade.
made  in  1998 would  not  be  followed  - They  conclude  that  the  degree  of link-  1945. Evaluating a Targeted
because  the  low  discount  rate  applied  age has  improved  over the  past  decade,  in  Social Program When Placement
to  returns  in,  say,  2020,  will  become  a  the short run  largely  as the result  of short-  Is Decentralized
high  discount  rate  as  the  year  2020  run  price  transmission  -and  to a lesser
approaches.  extent  because  of long-run  comovement.  Martin  Ravallion and Quentin Wodon
Since  it  makes  sense  to analyze  only  Improvements  in  information  technol-  (July 1998)
plans  that  will actually  be followed,  Crop-  ogy have made  it much  easier  for informa-
per and Laibson characterize  the equilib-  tion  about  demand  to be  disseminated  A social program that relies partly ongeo-
rium of an intertemporal  game played by  across markets, so changes in cotton prices  graphic  decentralization  for placement
an  individual  who discounts  the  future  attributable  to a price shock in one place  provides indicators helpful for identifying
hyperbolically.  Along an equilibrium  con-  are  soon  transmitted  to prices  in  other  the program's  impact  on welfare.
sumption  path,  the individual  will behave  places.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  5
An  assessment  of  the  welfare  gains  to result in a substantial  underestimation  market  volatility, and the possible dete-
from a targeted  social program can be se-  of the program's impact. Indeed, the sim-  rioration  in the quality of credit.
riously biased unless  it takes proper  ac-  plest possible control group method-as-  Improvements in prudential regulation
count of the endogeneity of program par-  suming  that  nonparticipants  provide a  should be followed  by improvements in the
ticipation.  valid counterfactual  - performed much  country's capacity to supervise banks and
Bias comes from two sources of place-  better  than a regression method treating  an upgrading of the banks' risk manage-
ment endogeneity: the purposive target-  placement as exogenous.  ment systems, to manage the increasingly
ing of the geographic areas to receive the  This paper - a product of the Develop-  complex operations  and diverse markets
program,  and the targeting  of individual  ment Research Group - is part of a larger  in which they engage. These steps should
recipients within selected areas.  effort in the group to evaluate  the impact  be a priority.  The institutional  develop-
Decentralization of program placement  of social programs. The study was funded  ment  of  banks  and  supervision  have
decisions is common, because of the  ad-  by the  Bank's Research Support  Budget  lagged behind market  developments.
ministrative cost of  centralized placement  under  the  research  project "Policies for  In improving the regulatory framework
decisions and  the  fact that  local groups  Poor Areas" (RPO 681-39). Copies of this  for banks, Estonia should avoid establish-
and  governments  are  likely to be better  paper  are  available free from the World  ing incentives for tax arbitrage  that  lead
informed about who most needs help. But  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washington, DC  to the  creation  of artificial  and  socially
full  decentralization  is uncommon;  the  20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,  costly financial intermediaries.
center  typically  retains  control  of broad  room MC3-632, telephone 202-473-3902,  This paper is a product of the  Poverty
geographic targeting.  fax  202-522-1153,  Internet  address  Reduction  and  Economic Management
Ravallion and Wodon argue that partial  psader@worldbank.org. Martin Ravallion  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia
decentralization  of program  placement  may  be  contacted  at  mravallion  Region. Copies of the paper are available
decisions creates control and instrumen-  @worldbank.org. (17 pages)  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
tal  variables  useful  for identifying  pro-  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
gram benefits.  tact Linda  Osborne, room H11-109, tele-
The central  allocation to a local level of  1946. Estonia: The Challenge  phone  202-473-8482, fax 202-477-1440,
government  is presumably  based on ob-  of Financial Integration  Internet  address  losborne@worldbank.
servable indicators. The central allocation  org. The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
will also  influence  the  allocation  to an  Carlos Cavalcanti  and Daniel Oks  ccavalcanti@worldbank.org  or  doks
individual  but  is unlikely  to determine  (July 1998)  @worldbank.org. (23 pages)
outcomes  at  the  individual  level  condi-
tional  on individual  program  participa-  To  gain recognition from its counterparts
tion.  So with  suitable  controls  for the  in  the  European  Union, Estonia  must  1947.  Patterns of Economic
welfare-relevant  geographic characteris-  give priority  to improving  risk  manage-  Growth: Hills, Plateaus, Mountains,
tics determining  program placement  de-  ment in its banks and improving institu-  and Plains
cisions, the center's  allocation across ar-  tional capacity for bank  regulation and
eas can be used as an instrumental  vari-  supervision.  Lant Pritchett
able for individual participation.  (July 1998)
The authors  use Bangladesh's  Food for  The most important  challenge of  Estonia's
Education program to illustrate  their ap-  strategy  for integrating  its financial sec-  The recent "growth" literature has under-
proach. A single post-intervention  cross-  tor with that  of the European Union (EU)  estimated  the importance - and ignored
sectional household  survey was used  to  is to upgrade  its  capacity for prudential  the implications  -of  the instability  and
identify the impact of  the program on school  regulation and supervision enough to gain  volatility ofgrowth rates.  In particular, the
attendance, using geographic placement at  recognition from its EU counterparts.  use of "panel"data to investigate the effects
the village level as an instrument  for indi-  Doing so is also a crucial  complement  of long-term growth  in developing coun-
vidual program placement. To deal with  to Estonia's  strategy  for strengthening  tries - especially with "fixed effects" esti-
bias from the endogeneity of village selec-  macroeconomic  policy and stabilization - mates  -is  potentially  more problematic
tion, the  authors used a detailed commu-  especially  because,  under  a  currency  than helpful.
nity survey coordinated with the household  board, its banks are a central part  of the
survey to control for likely sources of het-  transmission mechanism for capital flows.  Except during the Great Depression, the
erogeneity  in  geographic  influences  on  Under the  currency board banks  have  historical  path for per capita GDP in the
school attendance,  consistent  with prior  been able to arbitrage  between  domestic  United States has been reasonably stable
information on how the government tar-  and foreign financial markets  - increas-  exponential  trend  growth,  with  modest
geted the program geographically.  ingly  funding  themselves  from  abroad.  cyclical deviation. Graphically, growth in
They found that  the programs had  sig-  Such arbitrage  has become the key fund-  the United States displays as a modestly
nificant  and  sizable  impacts  on school  ing source for rapidly  expanding  credit,  sloping,  only slightly  bumpy,  hill.  But
attendance. At mean points, the program's  contributing to the country's large current  almost  nothing  that  is true  about  per
incentive increased attendance by 24 per-  account deficit.  capita  GDP for the United  States  (or for
cent  of the  maximum  feasible  days  of  Estonian  authorities  are  justified  in  other OECD countries) is true  for devel-
schooling.  tightening prudential  regulation  and su-  oping countries.
A  regression  estimator  ignoring  the  pervision because of the risks associated  First, per capita GDP in most develop-
purposive program placement was found  with  an  overheating  economy, general  ing countries does not follow  a single time6  Policy Research Working Paper Series
trend:  For a given country, there is great  in which each group of countries special-  to correct market failures in the financial
instability in growth rates over time, rela-  ize  respond  differently  to domestic and  sector.
tive to both average level of growth and to  foreign shocks.
cross-sectional variance.  Education  attainment  levels  increased
These shifts in growth rates lead to dis-  Business  cycles are  less volatile  in rich  dramatically for Mexico's  labor force  in the
tinct patterns.  Some countries have had  countries than in poor ones. They are also  1980s and  early  1990s. In  parallel,  the
steady growth (hills and steep hills); oth-  more synchronized with the world cycle.  country  experienced  a  pronounced  in-
ers  have  had  rapid  growth  followed by  Kraay  and Ventura  develop two alterna-  crease in earnings inequality from 1984-
stagnation  (plateaus);  others  have  had  tive  but  noncompeting  explanations  for  94,  reflected  in  a  higher  dispersion  of
rapid  growth followed by declines  (moun-  those facts.  wages and an absolute  decline in the real
tains) oreven  catastrophicdeclines  (cliffs);  still  Both  explanations  proceed  from  the  incomes of  less educated, poorer Mexicans.
others have experienced  continuous  stagna-  observation that  the law of comparative  This increased wage dispersion presents
tion (plains)  or even steady decline  (valleys).  advantage causes rich and poor countries  policymakers with a tradeoff between ef-
Second, volatility -however  measured  to specialize in the production of different  ficiency  considerations  (favoring  in-
- is much greater in developing than  in  commodities. In particular,  rich countries  creased  spending  on higher  education)
industrial  countries.  specialize in high-tech products produced  and  equity  considerations  (favoring  a
These  stylized  observations  about  by skilled workers and poor countries spe-  more equal  distribution  of per  student
growth rates, Pritchett  concludes, suggest  cialize in low-tech products  produced by  spending)  in  the  allocation  of  fiscal
that it may be useless to use "panel data"  unskilled workers.  resources to education.
to investigate  long-term  growth rates  in  Cross-country  differences  in business  Lachler concludes that  the best way to
developing countries.  Perhaps  more can  cycles then  arise  as a result  of asymme-  deal with this equity-efficiency tradeoff is
be learned about developing countries by  tries  among the  industries  in which  dif-  to encourage greater private participation
investigating  what  initiates  (or  halts)  ferent  countries  specialize.  Kraay  and  in higher education. His main findings are
episodes of growth.  Ventura  focus on two such asymmetries.  that:
There  is something  of a  professional  The first, which they label the "compe-  * The accumulation of human  capital
split in "growth" literature,  Pritchett  ob-  tition bias" hypothesis, is based on the idea  during 1984-94, as proxied by education
serves. Macroeconomists studying indus-  that  cross-country differences in produc-  attainment,  was accompanied by a more
trial countries discuss steady-state growth  tion costs are more prevalent in high-tech  equal  distribution  of  education  attain-
and ponder whether  all countries  in the  industries,  sheltering producers from for-  ment  levels  over that  period and,  thus,
"convergence club" will reach  the  same  eign competition  and  therefore  making  exerted an equalizing effect on the distri-
happy  level  in  the  end.  Development  them  large  suppliers  in the  markets  for  bution of incomes. The increased income
economists, on the  other  hand,  are  the  their  products.  inequality  observed  over  that  period
pathologists  of economics, having discov-  The second, which they label the "cycli-  appears to be caused by an increased rate
ered that  developing countries  are most  cal bias" hypothesis,  is based on the idea  of  skill-based  technological  change,
emphatically  not all  alike.  Developing  that  production  costs in low-tech indus-  whose transmission  to Mexico and other
countries have found ways to be ecstatic  tries may be more sensitive to the shocks  developing countries may have been facili-
but  they have also discovered many dif-  that  drive business cycles.  tated  by the  increased openness  of their
ferent  ways to be unhappy.  This paper - a product ofMacroeconom-  economies.
This paper-  a product of the Develop-  ics and  Growth,  Development Research  * The  greater  dispersion  of  wages
ment Research Group - is part of a larger  Group - is part  of a larger  effort in the  observed  in  Mexico  during  the  past
effort in the group to understand  the de-  group  to study open-economy macroeco-  decade  raised  the  rates  of return  on
terminants  of economic  growth. Copies of  nomics. Copies of the paper are available  investing  in higher  education,  reversing
the  paper  are  available  free  from  the  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  the  traditional  pattern  where  primary
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-  NW,  Washington, DC  20433.  Please contact  education  exhibits  the  highest  rates  of
ton  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Sheila  Aart  Kraay,  room  MC3-369, telephone  return.
Fallon,  room  MC3-638, telephone  202-  202-473-5756,  fax 202-522-3518,  Internet  * The  social  rates  of  return  across
473-8009, fax 202-522-1153, Internet  ad-  address  akraay@worldbank.org.  (45  levels of schooling were more uniform in
dress sfallon@worldbank.org. The author  pages)  1994 than  in  1984,  suggesting  a  more
may  be  contacted  at  lpritchett  efficient assignment  of education  spend-
@worldbank.org. (40 pages)  ing. At the  same time,  the  distribution
1949. Education and Earnings  of spending  on education  became  more
Inequality in Mexico  egalitarian,  as  per student  spending  in
1948.  Comparative Advantage  higher education declined markedly com-
and the Cross-Section of  Ulrich Lachler  pared  with per student  spending  at the
Business  Cycles  (July 1998)  primary level.  This surprising coincidence
in the  pattern  of spending  on education
Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura  Mexico'sgovernment should progressively  was only possible because Mexico  started
(July 1998)  shift more of the costs of higher education  out with a very distorted resource alloca-
to  its  direct  beneficiaries,  facilitating  tion  in education  that  was  both highly
Business  cycles are different  in rich and  the  private  absorption  of  those  costs  inequitable  and  inefficient.  As Mexico's
poor countries - because the industries  through student loan programs designed  policymakers are on the way to correctingPolicy Research Working Paper Series  7
these  distortions,  the  opportunities  for  between shallow integration  - attaining  each policy  announcement  and  piece of
avoiding  the  equity-efficiency  tradeoff  unconditional  intra-area  free trade  (in-  breaking news  during  the crisis reveals
within  Mexico's  centralized  education  cluding the  abolition of antidumping)  - that the market welcomed announcements
framework  will  become  progressively  and deeper integration,  especially agree-  that reflectedArgentina's adoption ofcred-
exhausted.  ment about common antitrust  rules.  ible policies and firm commitment  to the
* There  is little  reason  to expect the  He argues that  common antitrust  dis-  currency board.
pace of technological change, which  ap-  ciplines in PTAs tend  to be driven by a
pears mainly responsible for raising wage  broader agenda - which revolves around  Argentina  was hit hard  by the  Mexican
dispersion  and  the  relative  returns  on  attaining  economic integration  (for ex-  crisis  of  1994-95.  The  Argentine  peso
higher education, to abate. Efficiency  con-  ample, by creating  a single market), not  came under  attack  and  there  was a run
siderations  dictate  that  Mexico should  by a need to abolish antidumping.  Many  on bank deposits. Argentina  successfully
respond  by  devoting more resources  to  PTAs continue  to apply  antidumping  to  announced a series of policies to mitigate
higher  education.  However,  the  federal  internal  trade  flows.  the spillover effects, without abandoning
budget, which traditionally  has  financed  In practice, it may be that the demise of  its currency board.
the lion's share  of higher education costs  antidumping  in PTAs is constrained  be-  Ganapolsky and  Schmukler  show how
in Mexico, is unable to accommodate ad-  cause governments  are  concerned about  capital markets reacted to each policy an-
ditional  spending  on higher  education,  the potential for their partners  to engage  nouncement and piece of breaking news.
while spending cuts elsewhere in the edu-  in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial policies.  They find that  Argentina's  agreement
cation sector  are bound to raise  serious  They may consider antidumping  a useful  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund,
equity  questions.  Thus,  to avoid falling  defensive instrument  in this connection,  the dollarization of reserve deposits in the
behind in terms ofhuman capital accumu-  as it can substitute  for instruments  such  central bank, and the reduction in reserve
lation, greater private sector participation  as  countervailing  duties,  which  have  a  requirements,  among other things, had a
is necessary,  at least  in terms  of cost re-  much  higher  foreign policy content  and  strong positive impact on market returns.
covery  from  the  main  beneficiaries  of  may be more difficult to pursue.  The  market  welcomed  announcements
higher education.  If so, antidumping  is a particularly  in-  that  reflected  the  adoption  of  credible
This paper  - a product of the  Mexico  effective  and costly instrument.  Eliminat-  policies and demonstrated  a firm commit-
Country Department  -emerged  from re-  ing it in PTAs would help focus attention  ment to the currency board.
search in the preparation ofthe 1998  Coun-  on the real  source of trade  problems (in-  The authors  also find that,  after  a pe-
try Economic  Memorandum and is part of  dustrial  policies and  government  inter-  riod of higher volatility, the appointment
the department's larger effort to engage in  vention)  rather  than  on the  symptoms  of a new finance minister (after Domingo
a  fruitful  economic policy dialogue with  (allegations of unfair dumping).  Cavallo left the finance ministry) calmed
Mexican policymakers. Copies  ofthe paper  Earlier versions of this paper - a prod-  down stock  and  bond  markets,  signifi-
are  available free from the World Bank,  uct of International  Trade, Development  cantly  decreasing  the  variance  in stock
1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Research  - were  presented  at  the  and  bond market  returns.  On the other
Please  contactCarmenLazcano,  roomI4-135,  Brookings Conference  on Private  Prac-  hand, the interest  rate became more vola-
telephone 202-473-7776,  fax 202-522-2113,  tices  and  Trade  Policy and  at  a  CEPR/  tile after  the appointment  of the  new fi-
Internet  address  clazcano@worldbank.  Institut  d'Analisi Economica (CSIC)  work-  nance minister and when reserve require-
org.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at  shop  on  competition  and  trade  policy  ments were lowered.
ulachler@worldbank.org. (27 pages)  (Barcelona,  November  1997). Copies of  This paper  - a product  of Macroeco-
this  paper  are  available  free from  the  nomics  and  Growth,  Development  Re-
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-  search Group - is part of a larger  effort
1950.  Free Trade and Deep  ton, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada,  in the group to understand  how financial
Integration: Antidumping  room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,  markets  work. Copies of the  paper  are
and Antitrust in Regional  fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  available free from the World Bank, 1818
Agreements  ltabada@worldbank.org. The author may  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
be  contacted  at  bhoekman@worldbank.  Please contact Emily Khine, room MC3-
Bernard Hoekman  org. (42 pages).  347, telephone 202-473-7471,  fax 202-522-
(July 1998)  3518,  Internet  address  kkhine
@worldbank.org. Sergio Schmukler  may
Arguments  that common or similar anti-  1951.  Crisis Management in  be contacted at  sschmukler@worldbank.
trust  rules are essential for eliminating  Argentina during the 1994-95  org. (34 pages)
antidumping  do not  have a strong eco-  Mexican Crisis: How Did Markets
nomic foundation  and  are  only  weakly  React?
supported by existing regional  agreements.  1952. Enterprise Isolation
Eduardo  J. J. Ganapolsky  Programs in Transition Economies
Preferential  trading  agreements  (PTAs)  and Sergio  L. Schmukler
are  increasingly  including  elements  of  (July 1998)  Simeon  Djankov
"deep" integration  -efforts  to agree on  (August  1998)
common regulatory  regimes.  The Mexican crisis of 1994-95 had strong
Hoekman explores what the PTA expe-  spillover effects on other countries. This  Poor resultsfrom the isolationprogramfor
rience  suggests  about  the  relationship  study  of how capital markets  reacted to  financially  distressed firms  in Romania8  Policy Research Working Paper Series
suggest that enterprise restructuring  un-  MC4-406, telephone  202-473-3722,  fax  * High during  low world prices in the
dergovernment auspices does not work - 202-522-2530,  Internet  address  hvol  1960s and the  mid-1980s.
that transition economies shouldprivatize  @worldbank.org. The author may be con-  * Negative  when  world  prices  were
rapidly,  without  attempting  first  to re-  tacted at  sdjankov@worldbank.org.  (17  high in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
structure enterprises.  pages)  * Moderate  to  low by previous  stan-
dards between 1989 and  1994.
How  should  countries  in  transition  to  Incentives for cane production did not
market  economies handle  the  losses  of  1953.  Trade Policies  and  change  much  when  allowance is  made
large loss-making enterprises?  Over the  Incentives  in Indian  Agriculture:  for the  nominal  protection  of  tradable
past  six  years  several  governments  in  Methodology, Background  inputs (principally fertilizers) or subsidies
transition  economies have implemented  Statistics and Protection, and  for  the  principal  nontradable  imports
isolation programs that  combine features  Incentive  Indicators,  1965-95  - (canal  irrigation,  credit,  and  electricity
of reorganization under bankruptcy (as in  Background  Paper  1, Sugar  for pumpsets). Incentives for cane produc-
industrial  countries) with severance pay-  and  Sugarcane  tion  were  somewhat  higher  in  Uttar
ments for employees and assistance with  Pradesh than  in Maharashtra  and Tamil
labor deployment.  Garry Pursell and Anju  Gupta  Nadu.
Djankov  analyzes  isolation  programs  (August  1998)  Half of Indian cane production is used
for financially distressed  firms in transi-  by artisanal  producers of gur and small-
tion economies based  on empirical  evi-  This paper describes the methodology for  scale de facto unregulated  producers  of
dence from Romania,  the  program  that  a series of background papers  that mea-  khandsari  sugar. Because of India's com-
had the greatest  coverage.  sure  incentives  in  India's  agriculture.  plex regulatory system - especially in the
The results indicate that Romania's iso-  The first  study  on sugarcane and sugar  important  sugar-producing  state,  Uttar
lation program fulfilled none of its inten-  shows that the domestic market has been  Pradesh-  incentives  are  significantly
tions. Despite substantial  costs, it neither  isolated from world markets by extensive  higher for unregulated  activities than for
delivered tangible improvements in opera-  controls, but between 1965 and 1995 there  the modern sugar mill sector. Regulations
tional performance nor improved the pro-  was a significant  downward trend in the  subject sugar mills to controls that require
cess of privatization or liquidation of  large  ratio of domestic to international  sugar  them to:
loss-making enterprises.  prices.  * Sell specific quantities  of their sugar
Worse still, the program may have de-  production at low "levy" prices.
layed restructuring  by not imposing hard  This paper  is the first in a series of stud-  *  Sell molasses production at a fraction
budget constraints.  Firms included in the  ies to provide background  data  and pro-  (0.1 or less) of open market  and  border
program faced softer budget  constraints  tection  and  incentive  indicators  for  13  prices.
than  their  counterparts  outside the pro-  major Indian crops, which have been es-  * Pay  minimum  prices  (for  specific
gram.  Loss  makers  were  not  selected  timated  in connection with extensive re-  quantities  of cane) at above-free-market
through objective  criteria, and the agency  search on Indian agricultural  incentives.  prices,  except  in  years  of  cane  short-
in charge was not sheltered  from politi-  The general methodology of the studies is  ages.
cal  pressure  in  enforcing  hard  budget  described in the first section of the paper.  This paper is a product of Trade, Devel-
constraints.  The second section of the paper focuses on  opment  Research  Group.  Copies of the
Djankov therefore questions the feasi-  sugarcane  and  sugar.  It shows that  be-  paper  are available  free from the World
bility  of creating  special  programs  for  tween 1965 and 1994 real domestic prices  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington, DC
enterprise  restructuring  under  govern-  of sugar  and  cane  were  quite  stable  in  20433. Please contact Lili Tabada,  room
ment auspices, with government agencies  India, declining an average of 0.6 percent  MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896,  fax
choosingbeneficiariesanddecidingonthe  (sugar)  and  0.3  percent  (cane)  a  year.  202-522-1159, Internet  address  ltabada
scope of activity.  During the  same 29 years  the  free mar-  @worldbank.org. Garry  Pursell  may be
His conclusion supports the insistence  ket price of sugar  fluctuated  widely (ex-  contacted at gpursell@worldbank.org.  (89
of international  donor organizations that  pressed in Indian rupees) but in real terms  pages)
governments  in  transition  economies  increased about  1.3 percent  a year.
privatize rapidly, without attempting first  This contrast in trends  reflects the real
to restructure  enterprises.  devaluation  of the  rupee  after  1986 but  1954.  Politicians and Firms
This paper-aproductoftheEconomic  meant  that  by the early  1990s, at world  in Seven Central and Eastern
Policy Unit, Finance, Private  Sector, and  sugar prices of US 13-15 cents a pound or  European  Countries
Infrastructure  Network  - is part  of a  higher,  India's  domestic  prices  were
larger effort in the network to study tran-  roughly  equivalent  to,  or  below, world  Stijn Claessens  and Simeon  Djankov
sition economies. The study was funded  reference prices.  (August  1998)
by the Bank's Research  Support Budget  Because  of the  fluctuations  in world
under  the  research  project  "Enterprise  free market prices, nominal protection of  This study of how privatization  and sta-
Restructuring  in Bulgaria  and Romania"  sugar and sugarcane production in India  bilization (hard budget constraints) affect
(RPO  681-96).  Copies  of  this  paper  -asmeasuredbydifferencesbetweendo-  enterprise behavior shows that privatized
are available  free from the  World Bank,  mestic prices and border reference prices  firms consistently outperform state enter-
1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  - also  fluctuated.  Nominal  protection  prises inproductivitygrowth.  Totalfactor
20433.  Please  contact  Rose  Vo,  room  was:  productivity improves inprivatized  firms,Policy Research Working Paper Series  9
where there is also less overemployment  1955. Appraising Workfare  1956. Benefit Incidence and
than in state enterprises.  Programs  the Timing of Program Capture
Claessens and Djankov test several propo-  Martin Ravallion  Peter Lanjouw  and Martin Ravallion
sitions  derived  by Shleifer  and  Vishny  (August  1998)  (August  1998)
(1994, 1996) about how privatization  and
stabilization  (hard  budget  constraints)  Simple analytical tools can help appraise  Benefits  from schooling and antipouerty
affect enterprise  behavior.  workfare programs  when data and  time  programs  in rural India  were captured
They document the changes in financ-  are scarce. They can also help design bet-  early by the  nonpoor. The poor tend  to
ing, employment, and operating efficiency  ter programs.  benefit from program expansion, and lose
that  have  occurred in  more than  6,300  from  contraction. Conventional methods
manufacturing  enterprises  in seven Cen-  Workfare programs aim to reduce poverty  of assessing  benefit  incidence  hide  this
tral and Eastern European countries (Bul-  by providing low-wage  work for those who  fact.
garia,  Czech Republic, Hungary,  Poland,  need  it.  They  are  often turned  to in  a
Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).  crisis when there  is too little  time for a  Survey-based  estimates  of  average
They then  compare  the  relative  perfor-  rigorous  evaluation.  They are  also rela-  program  participation  conditional  on
mance of privatized  and state-owned  en-  tively complex programs, and difficult to  income are  often used  in  assessing  the
terprises.  evaluate.  distributional  impacts of public spending
Controlling for institutional  differences  Ravallion offers some simple analyti-  reforms.
and  the  endogeneity  of  privatization  cal tools for rapidly appraising  workfare  But program participation could well be
choices, they  find  that  privatization  is  programs.  For  pedagogic purposes,  the  nonhomogeneous,  so that  marginal  im-
associated with significant improvements  two programs  are  stylized versions  of a  pacts of program expansion or contraction
in total factor productivity and reductions  range  of programs  found in actual  prac-  differ greatly from average impacts.
in employment. Reductions in soft financ-  tice. One is for a middle-income country  Using the geographic variation found in
ing are associated with further  productiv-  (in  which  unemployment  has  risen  sample  survey  data  for rural  India  for
ity gains.  sharply  in the  wake  of macroeconomic  1993-94, Lanjouw and Ravallion estimate
State-owned  enterprises  employ more  stabilization  and reform), the other for a  the  marginal  odds  of  participating  in
workers, have lower worker productivity,  low-income  country  (hit  by  severe  schooling  and  antipoverty  programs.
receive more financing and  direct subsi-  drought). The sole objective of both pro-  Their  results  suggest  early  capture  of
dies, and have higher variable costs than  grams is to reduce poverty.  these programs by the nonpoor.
privatized firms, particularly firms priva-  By rough calculations,  the cost of a $1  Thus, conventional methods of assess-
tized for more than three years. Privatized  gain  to the  poor is $2.50 in both  cases,  ing benefit incidence underestimate  the
firms  also consistently  outperform  state  though the same gain in current  earnings  gains  to India's  rural  poor from higher
enterprises  in productivity  growth.  would cost 50 to 100 percent  more.  public outlays,  and  their  loss from pro-
Over time, the role of politicians in al-  Benefits  to the  poor could be  greatly  gram cuts.
locating  bank  financing  and  subsidies  enhanced  by  design  changes  - for  This  paper  - a  product  of  Poverty
appears  to have  declined, however, and  example,  switching to more labor-inten-  and Human Resources, Development Re-
banks have played a greater role in (effi-  sive production  methods for subprojects  search Group - was prepared  as a back-
ciently) allocating resources. And the in-  (in the middle-income country); enhanc-  ground paper for the Bank's 1998 Poverty
stitutional  environment  appears to have  ing the indirect benefits within poor com-  Assessment  for India.  Copies of this  pa-
improved in most  countries,  suggesting  munities  from the assets created; or striv-  per  are  available  free  from  the  World
that  the  influence of corruption has  de-  ing  for  greater  cost  recovery from  the  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington, DC
clined over time.  nonpoor.  20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,
The results-which  provide significant  This paper - a product of Poverty and  room MC3-632, telephone  202-473-3902,
support for the Shleifer-Vishny model - Human  Resources,  Development  fax 202-522-1153,  Internet address psader
demonstrate  the  beneficial  effects  of  Research  Group  - is part  of a  larger  @worldbank.org.  The authors maybe con-
privatization  in the presence of stabiliza-  effort in the  group  to provide practical  tacted  at  planjouw@worldbank.org  or
tion and decreasing corruption.  guidelines  for project and  policy evalua-  mravallion@worldbank.org. (37 pages)
This paper  -a  product of the Financial  tion.  Copies of the  paper  are  available
Economics Group, Financial  Sector Prac-  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
tice -- is  part of a larger effort in the net-  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-  1957.  Bidding for Concessions
work  to  study  transition  economies.  tact Patricia  Sader, room MC3-638, tele-
Copies of the paper are available free from  phone  202-473-3902, fax 202-522-1153,  Michael  Klein
the  World  Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  Internet  address psader@worldbank.org.  (August  1998)
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
Rose Vo, room MC10-628, telephone 202-  mravallion@worldbank.org. (25 pages)  When privatization  transforms  a public
473-3722, fax 202-522-2031, Internet  ad-  infrastructure monopoly into a private one
dress hvol@worldbank.org. The authors  by means of a long-term concession agree-
may  be  contacted  at  cclaessens  ment, how should concession contracts be
@worldbank.org  or sdjankov@worldbank.  designed and awarded?
org. (31 pages)10  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
In the past  decade it has  become popular  1958.  Total  Strangers  or Soul  Internet  address  jtroncoso@worldbank.
to  privatize  infrastructure  ventures  in  Mates?  Antidumping  and  org. The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
such sectors  as energy,  telecommunica-  Competition  Policies  in Latin  jguasch@worldbank.org or srajapatirana
tions, transport,  and water. For good rea-  America  and  the Caribbean  @worldbank.org. (26 pages)
sons or bad, private firms are often given
monopoly franchises  through  long-term  J. Luis  Guasch  and Sarath Rajapatirana
concession  agreements  (for  example,  (August  1998)  1959.  Is  There  a Credit  Crunch
build-operate-transfer  schemes).  in East  Asia?
Klein surveys issues associated with the  As Latin American and Caribbean coun-
design of such concession contracts  and  tries have liberalized their trade regimes,  Wei  Ding,  Ilker Domac,  and Giovanni  Ferri
their award to private parties. The discus-  they have enthusiastically  adopted anti-  (August  1998)
sion focuses on:  dumping  measures that reduce competi-
*  Contract  design  (what  is  to  be  tion. Competition laws are only beginning  To what extent can tight monetary policy
awarded).  to make their  appearance in the region.  help restore market confidence in the af-
* Whether  to use competitive bidding  Antidumping  and competitionpolicies are  termath offinancial  crises?Analyzing the
or negotiation  to make the award.  strangers in the region when they should  East  Asian  experience, this  study  con-
* How  to  structure  competitive  bid-  be soul mates.  cludes that protracted and heavy reliance
ding.  on tight  monetary policy  might  even be
* Who  conducts  the  auction  and  As a result  of trade reforms in the  1980s  counterproductive.  The study  finds  that
who monitors the concessionaires' perfor-  and 1990s Latin American and Caribbean  the credit crunch is widespread, and  its
mance.  countries became more open than  at any  negative impactparticularly  affects small
To encourage efficient performance and  time since World War II. However, these  banks and enterprises.
to minimize post-award  renegotiation,  it  countries have recently begun to use an-
is crucial to consistently and comprehen-  tidumping measures as the new protection  The  issue  of  the  credit  crunch  in  the
sively define performance  specifications  weapon of  choice,  as other barriers to trade  aftermath  of the Asian  crisis has  stimu-
and the parameters of incentives and risk-  have  been reduced.  In  fact,  the  fastest  lated much debate. Indeed, some features
sharing.  As a rule the concession award  growing antidumping  actions are within  of the East Asian economies, such as bank-
should  be  made  competitively,  unless  regional integration arrangements,  where  based financial  systems and  high lever-
there  are good reasons  to do otherwise,  they are being applied by member coun-  age, make them particularly vulnerable to
such as excessive transactions  costs (for  tries against  each other.  monetary  and  financial  shocks.  Under
the size of the contract) or special require-  Guasch  and  Rajapatirana  argue  that  such circumstances, the credit channel of
ments for speed or innovation.  antidumping  is anticompetitive  and that  transmission  of these  shocks is likely to
Typically,  competitive  concession  its  usual  justification  as  a  counter  to  lead to a credit crunch, affecting the flow
awards are made by first-price sealed bids.  predatory behavior is not relevant  in the  of bank  loans to those  agents  - house-
In a number of cases, however, there are  region.  It  is imperative,  they  say, that  holds and small and medium-sized enter-
strong arguments  for open auctions. Con-  antidumping  be  contained  if  not  alto-  prises  -for  whom close substitutes  for
cessions may also be re-awarded  by way  gether  eliminated.  While they  find that  bank  credit are unavailable.  In turn, the
of auction, although  somewhat arbitrary  safeguards are less anticompetitive  than  disruption to the availability of finance for
bid preferences may have to be set.  antidumping,  they believe that  all excep-  bank-dependent  borrowers  may  stymie
Auctioneers for complex  concession con-  tional protection measures,  such as anti-  economic activity.
tracts should operate at arm's length from  dumping, countervailing, and safeguards,  In  practice,  however, it is difficult  to
all  interested  parties,  including  politi-  should be considered together with com-  detect the credit channel effects that lead
cians. It may make sense to let indepen-  petition  policies. In  other  words,  they  to a credit crunch. Reliance on trends  of
dent agencies that regulate the concession  should become  soul mates  rather  than  credit aggregates  alone is inadequate  to
scheme run the auction.  remain  total strangers.  prove that there has been an adverse shift
This paper  -a  product of the Private  Guasch and  Rajapatirana  do not find  in the supply of loans: even a decline or
Participation  in Infrastructure  Division,  that  fine-tuning  antidumping  policy is a  slowdown  of credit  could  stem  from  a
Private Sector Development Department  good option. Rather, they believe that both  decrease  or  deceleration  in  demand.  A
-is  part of a larger  effort in the depart-  trade and competition policymaking ought  frequently used methodology to overcome
ment to analyze issues on private partici-  to be brought under a single entity, as in  this  problem  focuses  on  both  credit
pation in infrastructure. Copies  of the paper  Peru. This would lead to a more competi-  aggregates  and the yield spread between
are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  tive solution.  bank  loans  and  risk-free  assets,  such
H Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  This paper-  a product of the Finance,  as  government  bonds.  If  this  spread
contact Jocelyn Dytang, room Q7-183,  tele-  Private Sector, and Infrastructure  Group,  rises while credit aggregates  slow down,
phone  202-473-7161, fax  202-522-3481,  Latin America and the Caribbean Region  one can conjecture that the supply of loans
Intemet  address  jdytang@worldbank.org.  - is part of a larger effort in the depart-  has  either  decreased  more or increased
The author may be contacted at  mkleinl  ment to. Copies of the paper are available  less than  demand.  But further  qualifica-
@worldbank.org.  (24 pages)  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  tion is needed. The increase of the spread
NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  might simply reflect a rising risk premium
contact Joy Troncoso, room I5-059, tele-  triggered  by the  fact that  the  negative
phone  202-473-7826, fax 202-522-2106,  shock reduces the net worth of economicPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  11
agents because of  larger financial outlays.  mid-1970s to the  mid-1980s, income in-  an urban program, the emphasis  in the
Accordingly,  the  relevant  spread  to  equality seems to have stabilized in Chile  control strategy would  shift  toward  ser-
capture  the  worsening  credit conditions  since about  1987.  vices and goods consumed by the rich, in-
that  affect  bank-dependent  borrowers  With the stormy period of economic and  cluding transport. In a program including
is  the  spread  between  bank  lending  political reform  of the  1970s and  1980s  rural areas, optimal air pollution control
rates and corporate  bonds. The yield spread  well  over,  no  statistically  significant  would  be  reduced  because many  rural
between corporate and government bonds  Lorenz dominance  results  could  be  de-  households would be net losers, and they
measures  the general risk premium.  tected after  1987. Scalar measures  of in-  are poorer.
The  study  applies  this  methodology  equality confirm this  picture of stability
to Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  but suggest a slight change in the shape  As is evident  from  public finance  prin-
the Republic of Korea, and Thailand and  of the density function - with some com-  ciples,  redistribution  objectives  do not
shows  that  the  credit  crunch  is  wide-  pression at the bottom compensated for by  influence environmental  policies if there
spread, while its negative impact particu-  a stretching  at the  top.  are other, costless means of redistribution.
larly affects small banks and enterprises.  As inequality remained  broadly stable,  How does optimal environmental  protec-
On the basis of the findings, the authors  sustained economic  growth led to substan-  tion depend on redistribution  objectives?
claim  that:  (1) a  protracted  and  heavy  tial poverty reduction, according to a range  Eskeland  and  Kong develop a  frame-
reliance on tight  monetary policy, entail-  of measures and with respect to three dif-  work that  treats  air  quality  as  a  pure
ing high real interest  rates, appears inap-  ferentpovertylines. Povertymixedstochas-  public good, and tracks  net beneficiaries
propriate for restoring market confidence;  tic dominance tests confirm this result.  as those who value air quality  improve-
(2) it is desirable to consider alternative  All of these findings are robust  to dif-  ments more than their costs in a pollution
policy instruments  that  do not place fur-  ferent choices of equivalence scales.  control strategy.
ther stress  on the banking  sector and on  An examination  of the factors underly-  The framework highlights the distribu-
its lending to the corporate sector; and (3)  ing these trends  suggests that  an equilib-  tional characteristics  of the  public good
policy actions are warranted  to alleviate  rium has  (for the moment) been reached  and of the  costs for the  control strategy.
the strain  that the crisis has put on small  between rising demand for and supply of  One critical parameter  for the  distribu-
banks  and enterprises.  skills - the demand for skills associated  tional characteristics  of the public good  is
This paper  -a  product of the East Asia  with technological progress and the sup-  the elasticity  (with respect  to income) of
and the Pacific  Region - is part of a larger  ply of skills associated with expansion of  willingness to pay for environmental  im-
effort in the region to analyze the patterns  education. Chile's trading  pattern  might  provements.
and  consequences  of  the  East  Asian  well be tangential  to its  recent  distribu-  Strategies to control urban air pollution
crisis,  with  particular  reference  to the  tional dynamics.  would be altered  by redistribution  objec-
link  between  real  and  financial  sector.  This paper - a product of the Poverty  tives - to be more aggressive in reducing
Copies of the paper are available free from  Reduction Group, Poverty Reduction and  emissions  from  luxury  goods  such  as
the  World  Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  Economic  Management Network-is  part  transport  (private  and general) and  less
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  of a larger effort in the network to under-  aggressive  for goods more heavily  con-
Flavia  Fernandes,  room MC8-134, tele-  stand  income  distribution  dynamics  in  sumed by the poor (including several  en-
phone  202-458-0453, fax  202-522-1557,  developing  countries.  The  study  was  ergy sources).
Internet  address ffernandes@worldbank.  funded by the  Bank's Research  Support  Some air  pollution  control  strategies
org. The authors may be contacted  at wding  Budget under the  research  project "Pov-  cover urban  and rural  areas.  For those,
@worldbank.org,  idomac@worldbank.org,  or  erty and Income Distribution Dynamics in  optimal pollution control would typically
gferri @worldbank.org. (38 pages)  a  High  Growth  Economy: The  Case  of  bereducedbyredistributionobjectives,as
Chile, 1987-94" (RPO 681-59). Copies of  rural households are net losers, and they
this  paper  are  available  free from  the  are poorer.
1960.  Calm  after the Storms:  World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-  This paper-  a product of the Develop-
Income  Distribution  in Chile,  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Grace  mentResearchGroup-ispartofalarger
1987-94  Ilogon,  room MC4-644,  telephone 202-473-  effort in the group to study environmen-
3732, fax 202-522-3283, Internet  address  tal  problems  and  policies in developing
Francisco  H. G. Ferreira and Julie A.  gilogon@worldbank.org. Francisco H. G.  countries.  The  study  was  funded  by
Litchfield  Ferreira  may be  contacted  at  fferreira  the  Bank's  Research  Support  Budget
(August  1998)  @worldbank.org. August 1998. (50 pages)  under the research  project "Pollution and
the  Choice  of Economic Policy  Instru-
With the profound political and economic  ments  in  Developing  Countries"  (RPO
changes of the 1970s and 1980s behind it,  1961.  Protecting  the Environment  676-78). Copies of  this paper are available
and regardless  of its trade  patterns, Chile's  and the Poor:  A Public  Goods  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
income distribution  is, for the moment,  Framework  Applied  to Indonesia  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please con-
calm. Education  may be the most impor-  tact  Cynthia  Bernardo,  room MC2-501,
tant variable affecting the structure of, and  Gunnar S. Eskeland  and Chingying  Kong  telephone  202-473-1148,  fax  202-522-
changes in, inequality  in Chile.  (August  1998)  1154,  Internet  address  cbernardo
@worldbank.org. Gunnar  Eskeland  may
After rising  in the  1960s, falling in the  Strategies  to control air pollution  would  be contacted  at  geskeland@worldbank.
early  1970s, and  rising  again from  the  be altered by redistribution objectives. In  org. (32 pages)12  Policy Research Working Paper Series
1962.  The Political Economy  vious approaches to price instability  un-  tives  markets  and the use of risk  manage-
of Privatization: An Empirical  satisfactory. Increasingly, they are relying  ment  tools to solve public sector  problems.
Analysis of Bank Privatization  on market-based instruments to deal with  This paper - a product  of Rural  Devel-
in Argentina  price uncertainty.  opment,  Development  Research  Group  -
was  prepared  for  the  roundtable  discus-
George R. G. Clarke and Robert Cull  In  1995,  57 countries  depended  on three  sion  on New  Approaches  to  Commodity
(August  1998)  commodities for more than  half their  ex-  Price  Risk  Management  in  Developing
ports,  reports  UNCTAD. And commodi-  Countries  (Washington,  DC,  April  28,
Political  incentives appear  to affect  the  ties, fuels, grains, and oilseeds are impor-  1998). Copies of this paper  are available
likelihood  of privatization.  Provinces in  tant  imports  for several  countries.  The  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
Argentina  whose governors belonged to a  notorious volatility of  commodity prices is  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
fiscally conservative  party were more  likely  a major source of instability  and  uncer-  tact Pauline Kokila, room MC3-544, tele-
to privatize, and fiscal and economic cri-  taintyin  commodity-dependent countries,  phone  202-473-3716, fax 202-522-1150,
ses  increased  the  likelihood  of privati-  affecting governments,  producers (farm-  Internet  address pkokila@worldbank.org.
zation.  ers),  traders,  processors,  and  financial  The authors  may be contacted at dlarson
institutions.  Further,  commodity  price  @worldbank.org,  pvarangis@worldbank.
Clarke  and  Cull  study  the  political  instability  has a negative impact on eco-  org,  or  nyabuki@worldbank.org.  (36
economy of bank  privatization  in Argen-  nomic growth, income distribution,  and  pages)
tina. The results  of their  study strongly  poverty alleviation.
support the hypothesis that political  incen-  Early attempts  to deal with commodity
tives affect the likelihood of privatization.  price  volatility  relied  on buffer  stocks,  1964.  Public  Investment  and
They find that:  buffer funds, government intervention  in  Economic  Growth  in Mexico
*  Provinces  whose  governors  belonged  commodity  markets,  and  international
to the fiscally  conservative  Partido  Justi-  commodity  agreements  to stabilize  prices.  Ulrich Lachler and David Alan Aschauer
cialista  were  more  likely  to privatize.  These  were  largely  unsuccessful  - some-  (August 1998)
* Fiscal  and  economic crises  increased  times  spectacularly  so. Buffer  funds  went
the  likelihood of privatization.  bankrupt,  commodity agreements  were  Mexico's government has learned that the
* Poorly performing banks  were more  suspended,  buffer  stocks proved ineffec-  only way to ensure that the public inuest-
likely to be privatized.  tive,  and  government  intervention  was  mentprogram  contributes significantly to
They tested the hypotheses for a specific  both costly and ineffective.  growth  is by maintaining  a high quality
industry  in a specific country, making it  As the poor performance of such stabi-  of investments.  This means paying atten-
possible to control for enterprise  perfor-  lization  schemes became  more evident,  tion to rate of return and  clearly distin-
mance and institutional  characteristics. It  academics and policymakers began distin-  guishing  between the roles of the public
seems  reasonable  to expect  that  similar  guishing  between  programs  that  tried  to  and private  sector.
results  might  hold in other  industries  and  alter  price  distribution  (domestically  or
countries.  internationally)  and  programs  that  used  Mexico's growth  rate  began  to plummet  at
This paper  - a product  of the  Develop-  market-based  approaches  for dealing  with  roughly  the  same  time  that  its public  in-
ment  Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  market  uncertainty.  vestment  expenditures  declined.  That
effort in the group to investigate  the  de-  This change in approach coincided with  decline also  appears  to coincide with  a
terminants  of structural  change  in devel-  a  significant  rise  in  the  use  of  market-  slowdown  in the  growth  of infrastructure
opment  countries'  banking  sectors.  Cop-  based  commodity  risk  management  in-  capital  in  the  electricity,  transport,  and
ies of the paper  are available  free from the  struments  - aided  by the  liberalization  communications  sectors.  Because  of these
World Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washing-  of markets,  the lowering  oftrade  and capi-  parallel  developments,  many  economists
ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Paulina  tal control  barriers,  and the globalization  have  attributed  at least  part  of the  blame
Sintim-Aboagye,  room  MC3-422,  tele-  of commodity  markets.  forthe  decline in Mexico's growth  after 1981
phone  202-473-8526,  fax  202-522-1155,  By the mid-1990s, several  governments,  to the  decline  of public  infrastructure  in-
Internet  address  psintimaboagye  state  companies,  and  private  sector  par-  vestment.  The empirical  results  presented
@worldbank.org.  The authors  maybe  con-  ticipants  began  using  commodity  deriva-  in this report  provide  only limited  support
tacted  at  gclarke@worldbank.org  or rcull  tives  markets  to hedge  their  commodity  for this  argument.  They  also  suggest,  in
@worldbank.org.  (27 pages)  price risks.  Participation  in those  markets  tum,  that  increases  in public  investment
is growing,  but  important  barriers  to ac-  would  not  automatically  translate  into
cess remain,  including  counterparty  risk,  faster  output  and productivity  growth.
1963.  Commodity Risk  problems  small  groups  (such  as farmers)  One  reason  not  to  take  for  granted  a
Management and Development  have aggregating  risks,  basis risk  (no cor-  positive  relationship  between  more  pub-
relation  of local and international  prices),  lic investment  and faster  growth  is public
Donald F. Larson, Panos Varangis,  no local reference  prices,  low liquidity,  no  investment's  crowding  out  effect  on pri-
and Nanae Yabuki  derivatives  markets  for certain  products,  vate investment.  Although  the time-series
(August 1998)  and  low levels  of knowhow.  regression  results  for Mexico  all point  to-
International  institutions,  local govern-  ward  a  crowding  out  coefficient  of less
Many developing countries that are depen-  ments, and the private sector could facili-  than  unity,  the existence of a significant
dent on commodity prices have found  pre-  tate developing countries' access to deriva-  crowding out effect limits the growth im-Policy Research Working Paper Series  13
pact of public investment by reducing its  @worldbank.org.  The authors may be con-  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
net effect on capital accumulation.  tacted  at  ulachler@worldbank.org  or  velopment Research Group - is part of a
The  time-series  results  also  suggest  daschauer@abacus.bates.edu.  (19 pages)  larger effort in the group to link firm-level
that the economy's total factor productiv-  performance  with commercial policy.  Cop-
ity growth responds positively to  increases  ies of the paper are available free from the
in the ratio ofpublic to private investment.  1965.  Manufacturing  Firms  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-
In light of that result, increases in public  in Developing  Countries:  ton, DC 20433.  Please contact Lili Tabada,
investment  should have  a  positive net  How  Well Do They  Do,  and  room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6869,
impact  on  economic  growth,  despite  Why?  fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address
significant  crowding out  effects.  Chow  Itabada@worldbank.org. The author may
breakpoint  tests  indicate,  however,  that  James Tybout  be  contacted  at  jtybout@worldbank.org.
the positive productivity effect appears to  (August  1998)  (62 pages)
have weakened  significantly in the  past
decade.  Competition  among  manufacturers  in de-
A third  reason  for questioning  a stable  veloping countries  is remarkably  vigorous.  1966.  Sulfur  Dioxide  Control
relationship  is  that  the  impact  of  Nonetheless,  markets  are imperfect,  so the  by Electric Utilities: What Are
increased public investment  is likely to  general trend toward trade liberalization  the Gains  from  Trade?
depend  on how it  is financed.  The cross-  has yielded  benefits beyond the traditional
country  regressions  reported  here  indicate  gains  from  specialization.  Curtis Carlson, Dallas Burtraw,
that  a  general  increase  in  the  public  Maureen Cropper, and Karen L. Palmer
capital  stock  has  a  positive  impact  on  Manufacturing  firms  in developing  coun-  (August 1998)
growth only if financed through  savings  tries have traditionally been  relatively pro-
generated  through  lower public  consump-  tected.  Theyhave  also been subjectto  heavy  Title  IV  of the  1990  U.S.  Clean  Air  Act
tion  expenditures,  but  not  if  financed  regulation,  much  of it  biased  in favor  of  Amendments  offers  firms  facing  high
through  higher  public debt,  which implies  large enterprises.  Accordingly, it is often ar-  marginal  costs for pollution  abatement  the
higher current and future taxation levels.  guedthat manufacturers in these countries  chance to purchase the right to emit sul-
The scope for reducing  public consumption  perform  poorly in several  respects:  fur  dioxide  from firms  with  lower costs. In
expenditures  in Mexico is very limited,  * Markets tolerate inefficient firms, so  the long run such allowance trading may
however, since they  are already  at rock  cross-firm productivity dispersion is high.  achieve substantial  cost savings over an
bottom  levels.  Therefore,  the only way to  *  Small  groups  of  entrenched  oligo-  "enlightened"  command  and  control pro-
assure  that  the  public  investment  pro-  polists  exploit  monopoly power  in product  gram  with  a uniform  emission-rate  stan-
gram  makes  a significant  contribution  to  markets.  dard.  But  in the short  run  what  has  low-
growth  is  by  improving  its  "quality"  *  Many  small  firms  are unable  or un-  ered costs is technical  change  and  the fall
through  careful  attention  to its  rate  of  willing to grow, so important  economies  in low-sulfur coal prices.
return and complementarity with private  of scale go unexploited.
capital.  Tybout assesses  each of these conjec-  Title IV of the  1990 U.S. Clean Air Act
In Mexico  the most important  reforms  tures,  drawing on plant-  and  firm-level  Amendments  established  a  market  for
to make public investment  more produc-  studies  of manufacturers  in developing  transferable  sulfur  dioxide emission al-
tive came from policymakers' recognition  countries. He finds systematic support for  lowances  among  electric  utilities.  The
of the  need  to  distinguish  more  clearly  none  of  them.  Turnover  is  substantial,  market  offers firms  facing  high  marginal
between  the roles ofthe  public and private  exploited  scale economies  are modest,  and  costs for  pollution  abatement  the  oppor-
sectors.  This  led  to the  privatization  of  convincing  demonstrations  of  monopoly  tunity  to purchase  the  right  to emit  sul-
most  public  enterprises  and  a reorienta-  rents  are  generally  lacking.  fur dioxide from firms  with lower  costs. It
tion  of public  investment  to a more  nar-  Overprotection  and overregulation  are  is expected  to yield more cost savings  than
rowly focused set of activities.  In addition,  probably  less  a  problem  in  developing  a command  and  control  approach  to envi-
the  government  took important  steps  to  countries  than  are uncertainty  about poli-  ronmental  regulation.
strengthen  the  institutional  framework  cies and  demand,  poor rule  of law, and  To evaluate  the  performance  of  the
within  which  the  public  investment  pro-  corruption.  market  for  sulfur  dioxide  allowances,
gram  is determined.  Tybout  does  find  some  evidence  that  Carlson,  Burtraw,  Cropper,  and  Palmer
This paper  -a  product of the Mexico  protection increases firms' price-cost mar-  use econometrically estimated  marginal
Country  Department  - emerged  from  gins and reduces  average  efficiency levels  abatement  cost functions  for power  plants
research  in preparation  of the  1998 Coun-  at  the margin.  affected  by  Title  IV.  They  investigate
try Economic  Memorandum  and is part  of  And although  the econometric  evidence  whether  the much-heralded  fall in the cost
the  department's  larger  effort  to engage  on  technology  diffusion  in  developing  of abating  sulfur  dioxide can be attributed
Mexico's  policymakers  in  an  economic  countries  is limited,  it does  suggest  that  to allowance  trading.
policy  dialogue.  Copies  of the  paper  are  protecting  "learning"  industries  is  un-  They  find that  for plants  that  use  low-
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  likely  to foster  productivity  growth.  sulfur  coal to reduce  sulfur  dioxide  emis-
H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  All of which  suggests  that  the  general  sions, technical  change  and the fall in low-
Please  contact  Carmen  Lazcano,  room 14-  trend  toward  trade  liberalization  has  sulfur  coal prices  have  lowered  marginal
135, telephone  202-473-7776, fax 202-522-  yielded  greater  benefits  than  the  tradi-  abatement  cost  curves  by more  than  half
2113,  Internet  address  clazcano  tional  gains  from trade.  since  1985. And that  is the  main  source  of14  Policy Research Working Paper Series
cost reductions rather  than trading allow-  Dutch Disease phenomenon and agricul-  Under such a regime, if inflation exists,
ances per se.  ture.  The paper next examines the influ-  landlords  prefer  to rent  to tenants  who
In the long run, allowance trading may  ence of interest  rates on incentives in ag-  plan to stay only a short time. The authors
achieve cost  savings  of $700 million to  riculture, arguing that, surprisingly, this  assume  that  there  are different  types of
$800 million a year  more than  could be  has been a neglected area in the literature.  tenants (where "type" refers to the amount
expected from an "enlightened" command  The paper explores the effects on agri-  of time tenants  stay in an apartment)  and
and control program with a uniform emis-  culture of structural adjustment programs  that  landlords  are  unable  to determine
sion-rate standard.  But comparing poten-  implemented since the early 1980s in de-  types  before  they  rent  to  a  tenant.
tial cost savings in 1995 and  1996 with  veloping countries. The final section sur-  Contracts  contingent  on departure  date
actual emissions costs suggests that most  veys the literature  on agriculture and the  are  forbidden, so a  problem  of adverse
trading  gains were unrealized in the first  macroeconomy in  industrial  countries,  selection arises.
two years  of the program.  focusing on the  impact  of the  exchange  Short  stayers  are  harmed  by  rent
This paper-a  product of Environment  rate  on  export  competitiveness  in  the  control while long-term tenants benefit. In
and Infrastructure, Development  Research  United  States,  the  cost  of agricultural  addition,  the  equilibrium  is  Pareto
Group - is part of a  larger effort in the  protection for the overall economy in Eu-  inefficient.
group  to examine the successes  and failures  rope and Japan,  and the increased impor-  Basu and Emerson show that when ten-
of environmental regulation as a guide to  tance of fluctuations in money markets for  ant  types are  determined  endogenously
formulating environmental policy. Copies  the farm sector and the additional insta-  (when a tenant  decides how long to stay
of the  paper  are available  free from the  bility they generate.  in one place based on market  signals) in
World  Bank, 1818  HStreet NW, Washing-  This paper - a joint product of Trade,  the presence of rent control, there may be
ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Tourya  Development Research  Group,  and  the  multiple equilibria, with one equilibrium
Tourougui, room MC2-522,  telephone 202-  Rural Development Department - will  be  Pareto-dominated  by another.
458-7431, fax 202-522-3230, Internet  ad-  published in B. Gardner and G. Rausser,  In other words,  many lifestyle  choices  are
dress ttourougui@worldbank.org.  Maureen  eds., Handbook of Agricultural  Econom-  made  based  on  conditions  in  the
Cropper may be contacted at  meropper  ics, North  Holland Publishers.  Copies of  rental housing market. One thing rent con-
@worldbank.org.  (42 pages)  this  paper  are  available  free from  the  trol may do is decrease the mobility of the
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-  labor force,  because tenants  may choose  to
ton,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Alberto  remain in a city where they occupy rent-
1967. Agriculture and the  Valdes, room S8-015, telephone 202-473-  controlled apartments  rather  than  accept
Macroeconomy  5491, fax 202-522-3307,  Internet  address  a higher-paying job in another city.
avaldes@worldbank.org. Maurice  Schiff  Basu and Emerson show that abolish-
Maurice  Schiff  and Alberto  Valdes  maybe contacted at  mschiffl&worldbank.  ing the  rent  control regime can do two
(August  1998)  org. (37 pages)  things:  shift the equilibrium  to a better
outcome and result in lower rents, across
This paper surveys the literature on the  the board.
interaction between agriculture  and  the  1968. The Economics and Law  A version of this  paper  -a  product of
macroeconomy in both industrial and de-  of Rent Control  the Office  of the Senior Vice  President and
veloping countries, identifying  what  the  Chief Economist, Development Econom-
authors believe to represent its most sig-  Kaushik  Basu and Patrick Emerson  ics  - was  presented  at  an  Applied
nificant contributions and shortcomings.  (August  1998)  Microeconomics  Workshop  at  Cornell
University. Copies of the paper are avail-
Based  on an  economywide perspective,  What stirs most people against  rent con-  able free from the  World Bank, 1818 H
this paper begins with a discussion of the  trol laws  in the United States  and else-  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
bias against exports and agriculture that  where are stories of  people who have held  Please  contact  Michelle  Mason,  room
characterized the economic  literature and  apartments for many years and now pay  MC4-338, telephone  202-473-0809, fax
the development  strategies in many devel-  "absurdly" low rents for them. There are  202-522-1158,  Internet address mmason l
oping countries after World War II. This  important reasons for removing rent con-  @worldbank.org. Kaushik  Basu may be
is followed  by an analysis of how the mac-  trols, but the shock value of a low rent is  contacted  at  kbasu@worldbank.org. (40
roeconomic environment affects agricul-  not one of them.  pages)
tural  price  incentives.  Specifically, the
paper discusses  how policies concerning  Basu and Emerson construct a model of
industrial protection, exchange rates, and  second-generation rent control, describing  1969. Protecting the Poor
interest  rates and other fiscal  policies can  a regime  that does  not permit rent increases  in Vietnam's  Emerging
strongly influence the economic  incentives  for sitting  tenants  - or their  eviction.  Market Economy
for agriculture  compared with other sec-  When an apartment  becomes  vacant, how-
tors, identifying the most relevant  litera-  ever, the landlord is free  to negotiate a new  Dominique  van de Walle
ture and alternative  approaches used on  contract with a higher rent.  (September  1998)
this issue. It then proceeds  to examine how  They argue  that  this  stylized system
the real exchange rate can be affected by  is  a  good (though  polar) approximation  The very principles  on which Vietnam's
exogenous shocks,  such  as  the  foreign  ofrent control  regimes  that exist  in many cit-  highly  decentralized,  community-based
terms  of trade,  with  emphases  on  the  iesinLndia,theUnitedStates,andelsewhere.  assistance and safety net system is built arePolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  15
threatened  by the country's  emerging  mar-  tion inhibits Vietnam's  ability to provide  costs.  In  this  model  with  lump  sum
ket economy. Increasing household mobil-  adequate  protection from covariate risks  revenue  replacement,  reducing  a  tariff
ity, without  which  the market  system  can-  that  are  rising  because  of environmental  from  20 percent  to  10 percent  produces
notfunction,  especially  dictates  a rethink-  destruction.  Addressing  this problem  will  a welfare  increase  (in terms  of Hicksian
ing ofthe foundation of Vietnam's commu-  require  more national  risk  pooling and  equivalent  variation  over  the  infinite
nity-based safety net.  overcoming likely political hurdles  to a  horizon) of  10.7 percent  of the  present
reallocation of resources to Vietnam's poor  value  of  consumption  in  their  central
Under  Vietnam's  former  command  and vulnerable.  model, where  the  economy is  assumed
economy, lack of household mobility en-  This paper - a product of Public Eco-  to be unable to borrow on international
sured close  community and family solidar-  nomics, Development Research Group - financial  markets.  If  macroeconomic
ity, and households  belonged to local co-  is part  of a larger  effort in the  group to  and  financial  reforms  are  in place that
operatives  that  provided for the welfare  improve social protection policies. Copies  would  allow  international  borrowing,
of their  members. Developing a reliable,  of the  paper  are  available free from the  however, the same tariff cut is estimated
effective  system ofredistributive transfers  World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-  to  result  in  a  37  percent  increase  in
and safety nets to replace such faltering  ton,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Cynthia  Hicksian  equivalent  variation.  On  the
local institutions  will be important if Viet-  Bernardo, room MC2-501, telephone 202-  other  hand,  if  inefficient  replacement
nam is to make a successful transition  to  473-1148, fax 202-522-1154, Internet  ad-  taxes must  be used in an  economy with-
a market  economy.  dress cbernardo@worldbank.org. The au-  out the capacity to borrow internationally,
Van de Walle uses Vietnam  as a case  thor  may be  contacted  at  dvandewalle  the gains would be reduced to 4.7 percent.
study in rapidly  assessing  the strengths  @worldbank.org. (39 pages)  Larger tariff  cuts - typical  of those  in
and weaknesses of an existing safety net  many developing countries over the past
when  data  and  ex post evaluations  are  30 years - produce larger estimated wel-
weak. She  provides  a broad  qualitative  1970. Trade Liberalization and  faregainsatleastproportionatetothesize
assessment,  identifying  key  issues  on  Endogenous Growth in a Small  of the cut.
which knowledge must  improve.  Open Economy: A Quantitative  The  authors  apply  the  model to five
Vietnam's  poverty reduction  program  Assessment  developing  countries  and  estimate  the
and  safety  net  would  improve,  she  impact  of the  tariff  changes those coun-
concludes,  through  a  strengthening  of  Thomas  F. Rutherford  and David  G. Tarr  tries plan to undertake  as part of  Uruguay
institutional  structures  and  policies,  in-  (September 1998)  Round  commitments.  Because  of the  dy-
cluding:  namic effects, estimated gains are consid-
*  National  norms  for  identifying  the  Although  trade  liberalization  has  been  erably  larger  than  those  found  in the  lit-
poor consistently across regions.  linked econometrically  and through casual  erature  on  the  impact  of the  Uruguay
*  Survey and  other instruments  with  empiricism  to  large  income  increases,  Round.
which  to consistently  measure  and moni-  attempts  to quantify  its  impact  in static  This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-
tor local needs  and program  performance.  simulation  models  have shown  estimated  velopment  Research  Group  - is part  of a
*  Integration  and  coordination  be-  gains.  This  paper  shows  that  when  larger  effort  in  the  group  to  assess  the
tween  subprograms,  with  well-defined  the  endogenous  dynamic  effects  of  trade  impact  of trade  and  investment  on  eco-
and  universal  rules  for local implementa-  liberalization  are  built  into  simulation  nomic  growth.  The  study  was  funded  by
tion.  models,  the  estimated  gains  are  indeed  the  Bank's  Research  Support  Budget  un-
*  Welfare-maximizing  redistribution  of  very large. But complementary  regulatory,  der  the  research  project  "The  Dynamic
resources  across  space so that  everyone  is  financial  market,  and  macroeconomic  re-  Impact  of Trade  Liberalization  in Devel-
treated  equally,  regardless  of where  they  forms  are important  to realize  the largest  oping  Countries"  (RPO  681-40).  Copies  of
live.  gains.  this  paper  are  available  free  from  the
*  More resources  and attention  to help-  World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washing-
ing households  and communities  deal with  Rutherford  and Tarr  develop  a numerical  ton, DC 20433. Please  contact  Lili Tabada,
covariate  risk.  endogenous  growth  model approximating  room MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-6896,
The  government's  new  Hunger  Eradi-  an  infinite  horizon,  which  allows  them  to  fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address
cation  and  Poverty  Reduction  Program-  investigate  the relationship  between  trade  ltabada@worldbank.org.  David  Tarr  may
primarily  an  effort  to  coordinate  policy  liberalization  and  economic  growth.  be contacted  at dtarr@worldbank.org.  (49
efforts and resources  to improve  the safety  Economic  theory  generally  implies  that  pages)
net's  performance  and  cost-effectiveness  trade  liberalization  will improve economic
- could help  improve  social protection  by  growth,  and  the  two  phenomena  are
focusing  on these  five areas.  positively  correlated  in empirical  tests, but  1971.  Promoting  Better  Logging
Increasing household mobility, without  the connection is not well-substantiated in  Practices in Tropical Forests
which  the market  system  cannot  function,  numerical  general  equilibrium  models.
especially  dictates  a  rethinking  of  the  In the  authors'  model,  an intermediate  Marco Boscolo and Jeffrey R. Vincent
foundation  of Vietnam's  community-based  input  affects  aggregate  output  through  (September  1998)
assistance  and  safety  net system.  House-  a  Dixit-Stiglitz  function.  Additional
hold  mobility  makes  it difficult  to target  varieties  provide  the  engine  of  growth  Performance-based  renewal conditions  for
the  poor  and  mobilize  community  re-  in  this  framework  and  the  existence  of  tropical  forest  concessions  provide  a pow-
sources  to help  them.  Heavy  decentraliza-  this  mechanism  magnifies  the  welfare  erful incentive  for loggers to adopt reduced-16  Policy Research Working Paper Series
impact  logging  practices  and  to comply  This  paper  - a product  of the Develop-  sector  did not demonstrate  the same  per-
with  minimum-diameter  cutting  limits  - ment  Research  Group  - is part of a larger  formance  gains  as  privatized  provincial
even  with  short  concession  agreements.  effort in the group to elucidate  the econom-  banks.  The decision  to maintain  a public
ics of conservation  policies.  Copies of the  provincial  bank  is a costly  one.
In  government-owned  tropical  forests,  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  Policymakers  should  expect  privati-
timber  is often  harvested  under  conces-  Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  zation  to pass  through  some  or all of the
sion  agreements  with  private  logging  20433.  Please  contact  Tourya  Tourougui,  following  steps:
companies.  room MC2-522,  telephone  202-458-7431,  *  With  respect  to preprivatization  au-
Forestry  departments  typically  impose  fax  202-522-3230,  Internet  address  dits,  expect  losses  hidden  in these  banks
logging  regulations  to minimize  the nega-  ttourougui@worldbank.org.  Marco Boscolo  to be larger  than  those  indicated  in prior
tive environmental  impacts  of logging, but  may  be contacted  at  mboscolo@hiid.edu.  audits.
logging  practices  throughout  the  tropics  (52 pages)  *  Ifresidualentitiesarecreated,expect
appear  to  be  undermining  the  sustain-  them  to hold a large share  ofthe  assets  and
ability  of timber  and  nontimber  benefits  liabilities  ofthe  old public provincial  bank,
from  tropical  forests.  1972. Why Privatize? The Case  if the  quality  of its loan portfolio  was low.
Boscolo  and  Vincent  use  bioeconomic  of Argentina's Public Provincial  *  Do not  expect  the  price  paid  for the
simulations  to test  the  empirical  signifi-  Banks  privatized  entity  (the so-called good bank)
cance  of  several  common  recommenda-  to be great,  at least  compared  with assets
tions  for promoting  better  logging  prac-  George R. G. Clarke and Robert Cull  and  liabilities  in the  residual  entity.
tices  in tropical  forests.  They  find that:  (September 1998)  *  If  the  residual  entity  is  large,  the
*  Because  of the  effects of discounting,  province  will be confronted  with  substan-
longer  concessions  give loggers  little  in-  Argentina's  experience suggests  that bank  tial  short-term  liabilities.  But with assis-
centive  to adopt  reduced-impact  logging  privatization  may  succeed  only  when  ac-  tance  and  an  aggressive  asset  recovery
or to comply with minimum-diameter  cut-  companied  by a sound,  incentive-compat-  strategy,  governments  should  be  able to
ting  limits.  ible system  of prudential  regulation.  navigate  their  way  through  short-term
*  Royalties  can  be  used  to encourage  difficulty.
compliance  with minimum-diameter  cut-  Argentina  has been a leader  among  devel-  *  The  costs  of  privatization  are  less
ting  limits  but  discourage  the adoption  of  oping countries  in restructuring  its bank-  than  the  costs  of future  recapitalization,
reduced-impact  logging. And per tree  roy-  ing  sector.  Clarke  and  Cull  analyze  the  even if the  near-term  management  of the
alties,  which  encourage  compliance  with  performance  of those  banks  before  and  residual  entity  does  not  go well.
minimum-diameter  cutting  limits,  tend to  after  privatization  and  estimate  fiscal  This  paper  - a product  of Regulation
be less  effective  as revenue  instruments,  savings  associated  with  privatizing  and  Competition  Policy,  and  Finance,
*  Relatively  small  performance  bonds  Argentina's  banks  rather  than  keeping  Development  Research  Group  -is  part
can  be  used  to induce  loggers  to adopt  them public and later recapitalizing  them.  of a larger  effort  in  the group  to investi-
reduced-impact  logging,  but  very  large  The  authors  describe  the  process  of  gate the causes  and consequences  of bank
bonds  are  needed  to  induce  compliance  privatization,  including  the  creation  of  privatization.  Copies  of  the  paper  are
with  minimum-diameter  cutting  limits.  residual  entities  for the assets  and liabili-  available  free from the World Bank,  1818
*  Reduced-impact  logging  and  mini-  ties ofpublic  provincial  banks  that  private  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
mum-diameter  cutting  limits  both  have  buyers  found  unattractive  and  the  cre-  Please  contact  Paulina  Sintim-Aboagye,
significant  positive  effects on environmen-  ation  of  a  special  fund  (the  Fondo  room MC3-422,  telephone  202-473-8526,
tal  indicators,  but  these  benefits  come at  Fiduciario)  to  convert  the  short-term  li-  fax  202-522-1155,  Internet  address
the  cost of a substantial  reduction  in the  abilities  of  the  residual  entities  into  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  The au-
timber  value  of the  stand.  longer-term  obligations.  thors  may  be  contacted  at  gclarke
* Performance-based  renewal  condi-  They  argue  that  the  Fondo,  created  @worldbank.org  or rcull@worldbank.org.
tions  provide  a powerful  incentive  for log-  through  cooperation  between  the  Argen-  (36 pages)
gers to adopt  reduced-impact  logging and  tine  federal  government  and  the  World
to  comply  with  minimum-diameter  cut-  Bank,  was key in making  privatization  of
ting  limits  - even  with  short  concession  the  banks  politically  feasible.  Argentina  1973. The Economic Analysis
agreements.  privatized  roughly  half  of its  public  pro-  of Sector Investment  Programs
*  Performance-based  renewal  condi-  vincial  banks.
tions  sharply  reduce  the  size of the  per-  The Argentine  experience  suggests  that  Sethaput  Suthiwart-Narueput
formance  bond needed  to induce  compli-  bank  privatization  may succeed only when  (September 1998)
ance with minimum-diameter  cutting  lim-  accompanied  by a sound,  incentive-com-
its.  Royalties,  but not  area  charges,  have  patible  system  of prudential  regulation.  Economic  analysis  of sector  investment
a similar,  although  weaker,  effect.  The  regulatory  environment  affects  a  programs  should  use appropriate  criteria
The authors'  results  also  suggest  that  a  bank's  solvency.  -including  a clear public  rationale for the
cause  of premature  reentry  into  logged  Improved  regulation  and  supervision  expenditure,  motivated  by a desire either
forests  is minimum-diameter  cutting  lim-  alone  does  not  deliver  the  same  benefits  to correct a market  failure  or to alleviate
its  that  exceed minimum  commercial  log  as  improved  regulation  and  supervision  poverty.  Otherwisepublic  spending  simply
diameters,  combined  with  weak  control  combined  with  privatization.  The provin-  crowds out private  supply,  resulting  in few
over access  to logged-over  forests.  cial  banks  that  remained  in  the  public  net benefits  to the economy.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  17
One of the main objectives of a sector in-  This paper - a product of Public Eco-  cial integration  in a world of high capital
vestment  (or expenditure) program is to  nomics, Development Research Group - mobility. Copies  of  the paper are available
improve the development impact of pub-  is part  of a larger  effort in the  group to  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
lic  spending  in  a  sector.  Suthiwart-  improve the  analysis  of public expendi-  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
Narueput  focuses on how to use economic  tures and projects. Copies  of the paper are  tact Sheilah King-Watson, room G4-014,
analysis  to help sector investment  pro-  available free from the World  Bank, 1818  telephone  202-473-3730,  fax  202-676-
grams improve the development impact of  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  9810,  Internet  address  skingwatson
public spending. He uses Kenya as a case  Please contact  Cynthia Bernardo,  room  @worldbank.org. Pierre-Richard  Agenor
study.  MC2-501, telephone  202-473-1148, fax  may  be  contacted  at  pagenor
The analysis  emphasizes  using  stan-  202-522-1154,  Intemet address cbernardo  @worldbank.org. (42 pages)
dard  principles  of  public  expenditure  @worldbank.org.  The author may be con-
analysis to identify desirable  changes in  tacted  at  ssuthiwartnarueput
a sector spending program and to evalu-  @worldbank.org. (16 pages)  1975. Acting Globally While
ate the degree to which the planned spend-  Thinking Locally: Is the Global
ing program incorporates  those changes.  Environment Protected by
One of the  most important  criteria  is  1974.  Volatility  and  the  Welfare  Transport  Emission Control
that  such  planned  expenditures  should  Costs  of Financial Market  Programs?
have  a clear public rationale,  motivated  Integration
by a desire either to correct a market fail-  Gunnar S. Eskeland  and Jian Xie
ure  or  to  alleviate  poverty.  Otherwise  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  and Joshua Aizenman  (September  1998)
public spending simply crowds out private  (September  1998)
investments, resulting in few net benefits  Locally motivated  air quality programs
to the economy.  Financial integration may be welfare-re-  have only minor collateral benefits for the
Cost recovery may be considered desir-  ducing if world interest rates under finan-  global climate. If agencies  with global and
able, for example, because it alleviates the  cial openness are highly volatile. Opening  local agendas did business together, then
government's  fiscal constraint,  ensures  the economy  to  unrestricted inflows ofcapi-  individuals  and firms - and even cities
that  a good or service yields a minimum  tal, in particular, may magnify the welfare  - would act globally when thinking  lo-
level of benefits, and encourages a supply  cost of existing distortions, such as conges-  cally, and one would see greater synergy.
response from the private sector. But if  the  tion externalities or deposit insurance.
private benefits of the service are less than  Eskeland  and Xie find that  locally moti-
the costs, it would be better to transfer the  Agenor and Aizenman examine the effect  vated  air  quality  programs  for  urban
resources representing  the cost of  the ser-  of volatility on the  costs and  benefits of  transport  have limited collateral benefits
vice directly to the poor (subsidizing inef-  financial market integration.  in terms of protecting the global climate.
ficient services is not propoor). The good  The authors use a basic framework that  This could puzzle some, since these two
or service subsidized should be consumed  combines  the  costly  state  verification  public goods - one global, one local -
more by the  poor  than  by  others,  and  model and the contract enforceability ap-  seem to be jointly produced. However, air
within  those services there  should be a  proach. They assess the welfare effects of  quality in Mexico  City, Santiago, and else-
self-selection mechanism that targets the  financial market  integration  by compar-  where is predominantly pursued by tech-
services to the poorest. If subsidized goods  ing welfare under financial market inte-  nical improvements (making cars and fu-
and  services fail to meet  these criteria,  grationbycomparingwelfareunderfinan-  els cleaner), and not by reducing demand
spending should be directed toward other  cial autarky  and financial openness. Un-  for polluting goods and services (though
activities more likely to alleviate poverty.  der  financial  openness,  foreign  banks,  in  Europe  high fuel  taxes  help  reduce
There should be a reasonable relation-  which have lower costs of intermediation  demand).
ship  between  spending  and  outcomes.  and a lower markup rate, have free access  Control  programs developed under joint
Sometimes it is easiest to assess expendi-  to domestic capital markets.  stimulus  to protect the  global and  local
ture tradeoffs by looking at costs relative  The analysis shows that  financial inte-  environment have not yet been seen, and
to other benchmark interventions (such as  gration may be welfare-reducing if world  they  may surprise  us when they  come.
the cost of educating  a child). In Kenya,  interest  rates under openness are highly  However, they will likely rely more on
for example, the budget for agricultural  volatile.  reducing demand, using instruments such
extension  alone  was  double the  entire  The authors  extend the  basic frame-  as corrective  (Pigovian) taxes on fuels.  The
budget for the Ministry  of Transport and  work in various directions.  They show that  authors  show how, if locally and globally
Communications.  opening the  economy  to unrestricted  in-  charged  agencies  can  do  business  to-
Key economic indicators should reflect  flows of capital, in particular,  may mag-  gether,  consumers, producers, and cities
the key rationale:  correcting for market  nify the  welfare  cost of existing distor-  will act globally when thinking  locally.
failures  or  alleviating  poverty.  Perfor-  tions, such as congestion externalities  or  Only  then  will we know the  extent  to
mance indicators should also be assessed  deposit insurance.  which local and  global benefits are  pro-
relative to a specific  counterfactual (what  This paper  - a product of the  Macro-  duced jointly.
would the outcome have been without that  economic Management  and Policy Divi-  This paper - a joint product of Public
expenditure).  Control groups  should be  sion, Economic  Development Institute  - Economics,  Development  Research Group,
incorporated into program design from the  is part of a larger effort in the institute  to  and the Global Environment  Unit, Envi-
outset.  understand the benefits and costs offinan-  ronment Department - is part of a larger18  Policy Research Working Paper Series
effort in the Bank  to analyze  environmen-  Management  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  ments  crises.  They  also explain  the  ratio-
tal  problems  and  policies  in  developing  Central  Asia Region  - was  prepared  for  nale  behind  the  empirical  assessment  of
countries.  Copies of the paper are available  the  National  Bureau  for  Economic  Re-  the  interest  (inflation)  rate  sensitivity  of
free from  the World Bank,  1818 H Street  search  study,  Capital  Flows  to Emerging  monetary  aggregates.
NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact  Markets,  organized  by  Sebastian  Finally,  they  offer  estimates  of an  ag-
Cynthia  Bernardo,  room  MC2-501,  tele-  Edwards.  Copies  of this  paper  are avail-  gregate  money demand  equation  by intro-
phone  202-473-1148,  fax  202-522-1154,  able  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818 H  ducing  the  contract-intensive  money  ra-
Internet  address  cbernardo@worldbank.  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  tio  as a measure  of financial  innovation.
org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  Please  contact  Rose Vo, room MC 10-628,  This paper  - ajoint  product  of the Pi-
geskeland@worldbank.org  or  jxie  telephone  202-473-3722,  fax  202-522-  vate  and  Financial  Sectors  Development
@worldbank.org.  (19 pages)  2031, Internet  address  hvo 1@worldbank.  Unit, Europe and Central  Asia Region, and
org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  the University  of Maryland-  is part  of a
cclaessens@worldbank.org  or  rpolastri  larger  effort to study  monetary  and fman-
1976.  Capital  Flows  to Central  @worldbank.org.  (44 pages)  cial sector  reforms  in emerging  markets.
and Eastern Europe and the  Copies  of the paper are available free from
Former Soviet Union  the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Wash-
1977. Economic Reforms in  ington, DC 20433. Please contact Shirley
Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and  Egypt:  Emerging  Patterns  and  Dy, room H6-372,  telephone 202-473-2544,
Rossana  Polastri  Their Possible Implications  fax  202-522-0073,  Internet  address
(September 1998)  sdy@worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be
Rania A. Al-Mashat and David A. Grigorian  contacted  at  almashat@econ.umd.edu  or
Foreign  direct  investment  and,  more  re-  (September 1998)  dgrigorian@worldbank.org.  (21 pages)
cently,  short-term  debt and portfolio  flows
have  become  important  parts  of private  In addition  to conventional  sources of in-
capital  flows  to Central  and  Eastern  Eu-  creased costs of government  intervention,  1978.  Behavioral  Responses
rope and  the former  Soviet  Union. Private  the declining  popularity  of Egypt's  domes-  to Risk  in Rural  China
flows have increased  in response to reform  tic  debt  might  raise  short-term  interest
efforts,  the buildup  of reserves,  and  pro-  rates  and  increase  the  cost  of servicing  Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion
spective  membership  in  the  European  newly  issued  debt.  This  has  the potential  (September 1998)
Union.  of increasing  thefiscal  burden  and  under-
mining  the credibility  of the current  fixed  Does risk perpetuate poverty  in a credit-con-
Private  capital  flows to Central  and East-  exchange  rate regime.  strained  economy?Income  risk appears not
ern  Europe  and  the former  Soviet  Union  to discourage schooling  but does inhibit  the
have  taken  off in recent  years.  Foreign  Since  Egypt's  government  introduced  an  out-migration  of labor. Only a small  share
direct investment  was the most important  economic  reform  and  structural  adjust-  of  wealth  is  held  in  unproductive  liquid
such  flow from  1991-97,  but  since  1993  ment  program  in  1991,  Egypt's  Central  forms  to protect  against  income  risk.
short-term  debt  and  portfolio  flows have  Bank  has been engaged  in massive  steril-
also  been  important.  ized  interventions  to  support  the  fixed  Does  risk  perpetuate  poverty  in a credit-
The  increase  in these  potentially  more  nominal  exchange  rate  regime.  constrained  economy?
volatile  short-term  flows  raises  some  The result  of this  process,  however,  has  Jalan  and Ravallion  study  portfolio and
questions  about sustainability  and vulner-  been  an  increasing  fiscal  burden,  ex-  other  behavioral  responses  to measured
ability.  pressed  in the volume of outstanding  trea-  risk  using  household  panel  data  for rural
Perhaps  more  than  in other  developing  sury bills and the interest  payments  on the  China.
countries,  reform  efforts  appear  to be the  stock  of outstanding  debt.  One-quarter  of wealth  is held in unpro-
most  important  determinant  of  private  Al-Mashat  and  Grigorian  present  evi-  ductive  liquid  forms.  But  only  a  small
flows to the region.  Private  flows also have  dence  of this  and  point  out  new channels  share  of this  appears  to be  a precaution
responded  positively  to the  buildup  of re-  for increased  costs through  further  steril-  against  income  risk.
serves  (a proxy for improvements  in per-  ization.  In  addition  to  conventional  The authors  estimate  that  eliminating
ceived  creditworthiness)  and  to prospec-  sources  of increased  costs,  such  as differ-  income  risk  would  reduce  the  share  of
tive  membership  in the  European  Union  entials  between  foreign and domestic  real  wealth  held  in liquid  form  by less  than  1
(reflecting  greater  economic  integration  interest  rates,  the declining  popularity  of  percentage  point.  Moreover,  that  effect is
with  the West  and a greater  commitment  domestic  debt  might  increase  the  short-  confined  largely  to middle-income  groups;
to reform).  term  interest  rate,  thus increasing  the cost  high-income  households  do not,  it seems,
Official flows have been associated  with  of servicing  newly  issued  debt.  need to hold  unproductive  precautionary
the financing  of fiscal  deficits  and  appear  The authors  examine  the possibility  of  wealth,  and the  poor probably  cannot  af-
to have  led,  rather  than  followed,  coun-  an  increased  debt  burden  because  of at-  ford to do so.
tries'  reform  efforts.  tempts  to roll  over outstanding  debt  and  The  authors  find  no evidence  that  in-
This paper--  njoint  product  of the Eco-  extend  its  maturity.  come risk  discourages  schooling,  but risk
nomic Policy Division,  Poverty  Reduction  The authors  explore  the  importance  of  does  inhibit  the  out-migration  of labor.
and Economic Management  Network;  and  measures  involving  interest  rates  in light  Generally,  the results  provide  only lim-
the  Poverty  Reduction  and  Economic  of recent  literature  on  balance  of  pay-  ited  support  for  the  idea  that  uninsuredPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  19
risks promote unproductive portfolio be-  Caprio stresses  one conclusion: Given  * There are enormous  differences  across
havior in this  setting.  There is such an  the information problems inherent  in fi-  countries in the "wealth gap" - the differ-
effect, but it is small in magnitude  and  nance,  regulatory  systems  that  allow  ence in enrollment and educational attain-
cannot be deemed an important cause of  "multiple  eyes" to oversee the  financial  ment between the  rich and  the  poor. In
poverty.  system should  perform best. Bank owners,  some countries the difference  between the
This paper - a product of Poverty and  markets,  and  supervisors  must  all  be  rich and  poor in the  median number  of
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  given clear incentives and adequate infor-  years of school  completed is only a year or
search Group - is part of a larger effort  mation to monitor banks.  two;  in others the gap is as great as nine or
in  the  group  to better  understand  the  This paper - a product of Finance, De-  ten years.
causes of poverty. The study was funded  velopment Research Group - is part of a  *  The attainment  profiles can be used
by the Bank's Research Support Budget  larger effort  inthe group  to examine the role  as diagnostic tools to examine issues inthe
under the research  project "Dynamics of  of incentives in the financial sector. Copies  educational system, including the extent
Poverty  in Rural  China"  (RPO 678-69).  of the paper  are  available free from the  to which enrollment is low because of the
Copies  of the paper are available free from  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  physical unavailability  of schools.
the  World  Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  ton,  DC  20433. Please  contact Paulina  Filmer and Pritchett  overcome the lack
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Sintim-Aboagye,  room  MC3-422,  telephone  of data on income and consumption expen-
Patricia Sader, room MC3-632,  telephone  202-473-8526,  fax 202-522-1155,  Internet  ditures  in the  surveys by constructing  a
202-473-3902,  fax 202-522-1153,  Internet  address  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  proxy for long-run household wealth, us-
address psader@worldbank.org. The au-  The  author  may  be  contacted  at  ing survey information on assets  and us-
thors  may  be  contacted  at  jjalan  gcaprio@worldbank.org.  (32 pages)  ing the  statistical  technique of principal
@worldbank.org  or  mravallion  components.
@worldbank.org. (35 pages)  This  paper  - a  product  of  Poverty
1980.  The Effect  of Household  and  Human  Resources, Development Re-
Wealth  on Educational  Attainment:  search Group  - is part of a larger effort in
1979.  Banking  on Crises:  Demographic  and Health  Survey  the group to inform education policy.  The
Expensive  Lessons  from  Evidence  study was funded by the Bank's Research
Recent  Financial  Crises  Support Budget under the research project
Deon Filmer and Lant Pritchett  "Educational  Enrollment  and  Dropout"
Gerard Caprio, Jr.  (September 1998)  (RPO  682-11).  Copies  of this  paper  are
(September  1998)  available free from the World Bank, 1818
While household wealth is strongly related  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
Information and incentive problems lie at  to  educational  attainment  of  children  Please contact Sheila Fallon, room MC3-
the root of many recent financial crises in  nearly everywhere, the  magnitude  and  638,  telephone 202-473-8009,  fax 202-522-
Asian  and  Latin  American  economies.  pattern  of  the  effect  of  wealth  differs  1153, Internet address sfallon@aworldbank.
Effective regulation is also important: The  widely. The gap in attainment  of children  org  The  authors  may  be  contacted at
economies  with the most conservative  regu-  of the poor and rich ranges from only one  dfilmer@worldbank.org  or  lpritchett
latory environments weathered the crises  or two years in some countries to nine or  @worldbank.org.  (38 pages)
best.  ten years in others. This attainment gap
is the result of different patterns of enroll-
What has caused the epidemic of  financial  ment and dropout: while in South America  1981. Evaluating  Public Expenditures
crisesinthepast20years?Andwhatsteps  low attainment  among the poor is almost  When  Governments  Must  Rely  on
can be taken  - perhaps  are being taken  entirely  due  to  children  who  enroll  Distortionary  Taxation
- to minimize financial vulnerability?  then drop out early, in West Africa and
Caprio  summarizes  both  basic  and  South  Asia  many  poor  children  never  James  E. Anderson and Will Martin
proximate factors behind financial crises,  enroll.  (September  1998)
arguing that  although a variety of  factors
contribute to the crises, the basic causes  Using  household  survey  data  from  44  This  paper  offers simple,  robust opera-
are information and incentive problems.  Demographic and Health  Surveys in 35  tional rules for evaluating public spend-
Caprio develops  a scoring system for the  countries, Filmer and Pritchett  document  ing in distorted economies  - rules that are
broad regulatory environment for a dozen  different patterns  in the  enrollment and  more complex than the border price rule
Asian and Latin American financial sys-  attainment  of  children from rich and poor  but involve  only one additionalparameter:
tems in 1997.  The Asian economies  in cri-  households. They find that:  the marginal cost of funds.
sis score the lowest. Economies with high  *  Enrollment profiles of the poor differ
scores felt relatively little impact from the  across countries but fall into distinctive  Anderson and Martin provide simple, ro-
crises.  regional patterns.  In some areas (includ-  bust rules for evaluating public spending
The scoring system may serve as a guide  ing much of South America) the poor reach  in  distorted  economies. Their  analysis
for how countries might assign priorities  nearly universal enrollment in first grade  integrates  within a clean, unified frame-
to improvements in their  regulatory  en-  but then drop out in droves. In others (in-  work previous treatments  of  project evalu-
vironment,  although further  research  is  cluding much of South Asia and West Af-  ation as special cases.
needed to sort out more important factors  rica), the poor never enroll. Both patterns  Until  recently  it was widely believed
from less important factors.  lead to low attainment.  that  government projects could be evalu-20  Policy Research Working Paper Series
ated without reference to the cost of rais-  be  contacted  at  wmartinl@worldbank.  affected  by  almost  all  aspects  of
ing tax revenues. The classic border price  org. (27 pages)  transition  reform).
rule provided a simple and apparently ro-  Among their  many conclusions:
bust procedure for project evaluation. But  * Bank "safety" is an elusive concept in
the border price rule developed in shadow  1982. Analyzing  Financial  Sectors  transition economies, one not easily man-
pricing  literature  requires  very  strong  in Transition:  With  Special  aged.
assumptions  to  be valid  when  govern-  Reference  to the Former  Soviet  * A transitional  banking  system may
ments must rely on distortionary taxation  Union  be quite  "safe" even though  regulatory
and are  unable or unwilling to cover the  reform may have progressed  only mini-
costs of the project through user charges.  Alan Roe,  Paul Siegelbaum,  and Tim  King  mally.
Anderson  and  Martin  use  a  rigorous  (September  1998)  Their analysis helps to account for sev-
formal model in which governments must  eral  paradoxes  observed  in  transition
rely on distortionary  taxation  to explore  One result ofignoring the true messiness of  banking systems, including the relatively
the welfare consequences of  governments  the transition from a command to a market  long-term survival of banks which by any
providing different  types of goods. They  economy  is  thatgovernments are sometimes  objective standard  are insolvent.
show that the border price rule is accurate  offeredflawedpolicy recommendations  and  This  paper  is  a  product  of  Ukraine/
only  in  one  rather  special  case: when  conclusions that are at odds with reality.  Belarus Country Unit,  Europe and Cen-
project outputs are sold at their full value  Here is a framework for reflecting on cer-  tral Asia Region. Copies of the paper are
to consumers-something  that is difficult  tain features of bank behavior during the  available free from the World Bank, 1818
to do with a public good such as a light-  transition from a command to a market  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
house or a functioning judicial system.  economy - and on public policy interven-  Please contact Diana  Cortijo, room H2-
When a publicly provided good is sold  tions for the sector often advocated by the  023,  telephone 202-458-4005,  fax 202-477-
for less than  its full value to consumers,  International Monetary Fund, the World  3288,  Internet  address  dcortijo
one must  take into account the implica-  Bank, and other donor agencies.  @worldbank.org.  The authors may be con-
tions for government revenues of provid-  tactedat aroe@worldbankorgorpsiegelbaum
ing public goods. Anderson and  Martin  The economic  transition from a command  Cworldbank.org. (55 pages)
present  project evaluation rules  that are  to a market  economy  is a complex, messy
more complex than  the border price rule  process,  during  which  the  incentives of
but involve  only  one additional parameter:  economic agents may be significantly dif-  1983.  Pension  Reform in
the  compensated marginal  cost of funds  ferent from incentives familiar to Western  Small  Developing  Countries
for the  taxes on which the  government  economies. As a result, attempts to trans-
relies.  plant  Western  institutional  and  regula-  Thomas  Charles  Glaessner  and
The rules  suggested  involve adjusting  tory norms of good  practice into transition  Salvador  Valdes-Prieto
the fiscal revenues the project generates  economies may  produce  disappointing,  (September  1998)
(or  destroys)  by  the  marginal  cost  of  even counterproductive,  results.
funds  before comparing  them  with  the  Roe, Siegelbaum, and King show some  For small countries the Chilean pension
assessed benefits to project producers an-d  specific  characteristics of  transition econo-  model should be modified to rely more on
consumers.  mies that are likely to have an impact on  international trade in financial services  -
In the case of a protected but tradable  bank behavior and safety. They argue that  especially services that benefit from econo-
good provided by the government, the re-  these characteristics do not inevitably fade  mies of scale  and scope,  such as collections,
sult  is a shadow price that  is below the  away as  the transition  proceeds; indeed,  accountprocessing, and benefitpayments.
world market price. Where projects pro-  they may endure for an extended period.  The unbundlingofpension  services-such
duce output that  is sold without charge,  This being  so, Roe, Siegelbaum,  and  as the collection of contributions and the
the costs of the project inputs  must also  King propose a simple analytical  frame-  payment  of benefits - is more advanta-
be  adjusted  using  the  marginal  cost  of  work designed to shed light on the char-  geous in small than in large countries.
funds.  In intermediate  cases where  the  acteristics of the banking sector during the
government levies user charges that  fall  transition. This framework relies on famil-  Glaessner  and  Valdes-Prieto  provide a
below the full value of the  goods to the  iar theories of asymmetric information  and  framework in which small countries can
private sector, the revenue shortfall from  the potential advantages banks have in miti-  assess the proper role for the state and the
the project must be adjusted  by the mar-  gating both the adverse  risk and moral haz-  private sector in pension policy.  Based on
ginal cost of funds.  ard associated  with imperfect information.  industrial  organization  theory and  pen-
This paper  - a product of Trade, De-  This framework suggests that the safety  sion economics,  this framework draws on
velopment Research Group - is part of a  of an individual  bank  (and by extension  experience in small countries.
larger  effort in the  group  to assess  the  the system) depends on three factors that  The authors  identify how optimal pen-
consequences  of policy  interventions. Cop-  evolve  significantly during the transition:  sion policies  can change in small countries
ies of  the paper are available free from the  * The bank's own internal information  (those with  fewer than  1 million active
World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-  and information  processing capabilities.  contributors  to pension  funds),  explore
ton, DC 20433.  Please contact Lili Tabada,  * The  sophistication  of the  banking  optimal pension reform design for small
room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,  products it tries to offer.  countries, and incorporate other stylized
fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  *  The external operating environment  assumptions  about  small countries  into
ltabada@worldbank.org. Will Martin may  the  bank  faces (an environment  that  is  the discussion: the relatively  greater in-Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  21
ternational  mobility of labor and capital,  1984. NAFTA, Capital Mobility,  @dworldbank.org. Thomas Glaessner may
the greater scarcity of human capital spe-  and Mexico's Financial System  be  contacted  at  thomassglaessner
cialized in financial supervision and  tax  @sfmny.ccm.  (55 pages)
administration,  fewer independent inter-  Thomas  Charles  Glaessner  and Daniel  Oks
ests,  and  higher  political volatility  and  (September  1998)
risk over long time horizons.  1985.  The Optimality of Being
They conclude that:  Several  analytical  approaches are  inte-  Efficient: Designing Auctions
* For small countries the Chilean model  grated to answer three  questions:Are there
should be modified to include greater  re-  aspects of the NAFTA  accord, combined  Lawrence  M.  Ausubel  and Peter Cramton
liance on international  trade in financial  with  liberalization of Mexico's financial  (September  1998)
services - especially services that benefit  system, that will affect the efficiency with
from economies of scale and scope, such  which financial services are provided or  This  paper  provides  a  new defense for
as  collections, account  processing,  and  the size and composition of capital flows  emphasizing  efficient  auction  design
benefit  payments.  Such  an  approach  to Mexico? How does NAFTA affect mac-  rather than  optimal auction design. Be-
would require a greater harmonization of  roeconomic and  microeconomic policies  cause in auction markets followed by per-
accounting and regulatory standards  be-  related  to  the  financial  system?  And  fect resale, it is "optimal" to be "efficient."
tween small developing countries and the  through which channels will NAFTA af-
countries  from which  financial  services  fect macroeconomic  stability or risk in the  In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimiz-
are imported.  financial system?  ing seller often awards goods  inefficiently,
* The unbundling  of pension services  either by placing them in the wrong  hands
is more advantageous  in small than  in  Typically the impact of the North Ameri-  or by withholding them from the market.
large countries.  can Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA) is  This conclusion  rests on two assumptions:
- The collection of contributions  and  analyzed from a macroeconomic  perspec-  (1) the  seller can prevent  resale  among
the  payment  of  benefits  (which  are  tive, to examine the implications for capi-  bidders after the auction, and (2)  the seller
subject to substantial  economies of scale  tal market flows or for the aggregate de-  can commit to not selling the  withheld
for small countries) should be mandato-  gree of financial integration.  This analy-  goods after the auction.
rily  unbundled  from  other  pension  sis often involves examining whether cer-  Ausubel  and  Cramton  examine  how
services.  tain  conditions of arbitrage  or efficiency  the  optimal  auction  problem  changes
* Those  services  should be  provided  tend to hold, given greater integration  of  when those assumptions  are relaxed. In
separately  to ensure  competition in the  financial markets.  sharp  contrast to the  no-resale assump-
selection of trustees  and competitive in-  Alternatively,  other  work  examines  tion, they assume perfect resale: all gains
vestment management services.  This type  only the  effects of greater  financial inte-  from trade  are exhausted  in resale. In a
of pension system design may be prefer-  gration for the efficiency  with which finan-  multiple-object model with  independent
able to having  a foreign firm provide all  cial  services  are  provided  microecono-  signals,  they  characterize  optimal  auc-
pension services.  mically.  tions  with resale.  They prove generally
* When  other  assumptions  (such as  The  two approaches  are  rarely  com-  that  with  perfect resale,  the  seller  can
susceptibility  to  large  gross  migration  bined, nor  are the  effects of integration  do no better than assign goods efficiently.
flows)  are combined with the assumption  considered within such a combined frame-  Moreover, any  misassignment  of goods
of a small-country base, mandatory  pen-  work.  strictly lowers the  seller's  revenue from
sion systems or fiscal incentives are found  Glaessner  and  Oks  combine the  two  the optimum. In auction markets followed
to be less effective in small than  in large  approaches to examine how NAFTA will  by  perfect  resale,  it  is  optimal  to  be
countries. Large  countries have broader  affect capital flows and the efficiency  with  efficient.
contribution  bases  and  much  smaller  which financial  services are  provided in  The authors' results  provide a new de-
gross migration  flows, making them de-  Mexico.  fense  for emphasizing  efficient  auction
mographically more stable.  They also call attention  to domestic fi-  design  rather  than  optimal  auction  de-
* The relatively greater  international  nancial  system  and  monetary  and  ex-  sign.  The presence  of a  perfect  resale
migration  in  small  countries  makes  change  rate  policy issues  that  Mexico  market forces even the most selfish seller,
full  funding  of  pension  systems  even  must address if greater financial integra-  whose sole objective is maximizing rev-
more important  in  small than  in  large  tion is not to result  in increased risk for  enues,  to focus - out of necessity - on
countries.  the domestic financial system or greater  efficiency.  Given the vast and active resale
This  paper  is a  product of the  Latin  macroeconomic  instability.  market  in Treasury  securities,  it seems
America and the Caribbean Region. Cop-  This paper  - a product  of the  Latin  safe to assert that the model with perfect
ies of the paper are available free from the  America and the Caribbean Region - is  resale  is a better description  of the  U.S.
World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-  part of a larger effort in the region to ex-  Treasury market than the model without
ton,  DC  20433. Please  contact  Miguel  amine the impact of cross-regional policy  any resale - so its predictions  ought to
Navarro, room 15-076,  telephone 202-458-  lessons. Copies of the paper are available  be taken more seriously.
4722, fax 202-522-2106,  Internet  address  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  This paper - a product of the Private
mnavarromartin@worldbank.org.  The  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-  Participation  in Infrastructure  Division,
authors  may  be  contacted  at  tact  Miguel Navarro,  room 15-076, tele-  Private Sector Development Department
thomas-glaessner@sfmny.com or svaldes  phone  202-458-4722, fax 202-522-2106,  - is part of a larger  effort in the depart-
@volcan.facea.puc.cl.  (55 pages)  Intemet  address  mnavarromartin  ment to study issues arising from private22  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
participation  in infrastructure.  The study  roles  of  various  rules,  the  possibilities  ing  a  series  of  institutional  reforms  in
was funded  by the Bank's  Research  Sup-  for  introducing  combinatorial  bidding,  Pakistan's  water  sector.
port  Budget  under  the  research  project  and  some considerations  in adapting  the
"Auctions  in  Infrastructure"  (RPO  682-  auction  for  sales  with  a  revenue  goal.  It  is difficult  and  time-consuming  to get
58). Copies of this paper  are available  free  Drawing  on both traditional  and new ele-  adequate  information  about  influence
from the  World Bank,  1818 H Street  NW,  ments  of  auction  theory,  he  concludes,  groups  in a society.  Dinar,  Balakrishnan,
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  theorists  have  been  able  to  analyze  and Wambia  develop  an approach  to esti-
Sandra  Vivas,  room  Q7-005,  telephone  proposed  designs,  detect  biases,  predict  mating  the  political  risk  associated  with
202-458-2809,  fax 202-522-2029,  Internet  shortcomings,  identify  tradeoffs,  and rec-  implementing  a  set  of  institutional  re-
address  svivas@worldbank.org.  The  au-  ommend  solutions.  forms in the water  sector.  Their  approach
thors  may  be  contacted  at  ausubel  But in designing  real auctions  there  are  endogenizes  the  actions  taken  by politi-
@econ.umd.edu  or  peter@cramton.umd.  important  practical  questions  for  which  cians,  users,  service  providers,  and other
edu.  (23 pages)  theory  currently  offers  no answers.  The  stakeholders.  Their  analysis  provides  in-
"bounded  rationality"  constraints  that  sights  into the  relationships  between  in-
limit  the  effectiveness  of the  generalized  stitutional  arrangements,  the  power
1986. Putting Auction Theory  Vickrey auction have so far proved par-  structure,  and policy outcomes.
to Work: The Simultaneous  ticularly  resistant  to  simple  analysis.  The authors  develop a two-tier tool to
Ascending Auction  Because of such limits to our knowledge,  assess  the  risks  associated  with  imple-
auction  design  is  a kind  of  engineering  menting  reform.  The  first  tier  is a struc-
Paul Milgrom  activity.  It  entails  practical  judgments,  tured  analysis  of the distribution  of power
(September 1998)  guided  by  theory  and  all  available  evi-  among  groups  interested  in  the  outcome
dence,  but  it also  uses  ad hoc methods  to  of reform.  The second  tier is a Delphi  pro-
Economic  theory was used in designing  the  resolve issues  about which theory is silent.  cess,  based  on experts'  opinions.
"simultaneous  ascending  auction,"  which  As with  other  engineering  activities,  the  Their  approach  is  a  compromise  be-
was introduced  in  1994 to sell  U.S.  radio  practical  difficulties  ofdesigningeffective  tween  the  two  options:  the  first  (struc-
spectrum  licenses.  But  in  designing  real  real auctions  themselves  inspire  new theo-  tured  analysis)  is costly and time-consum-
auctions  there  are  important  practical  retical  analyses,  which  appear  to be lead-  ing  and  often  entails  creating  and  using
questions  for  which  current  economic  ing to new, more efficient,  and more robust  pseudo-precise  indices;  the  second
theory  offers  no answers.  designs.  (Delphi)  process  is an  unstructured  "ex-
This  paper  - a product  of the  Private  pert  opinion"  way  of assessing  risk.
Milgrom  discusses  how  economic  theory  Participation  in  Infrastructure  Division,  Their  compromise  approach  provides  a
was  used  in the design  and  improvement  Private  Sector  Development  Department  manageable  framework  that,  after  some
of the  "simultaneous  ascending  auction,"  - is part  of a larger  effort  in the depart-  testing,  could  be added  to the  feasibility
developed  initially  for  the  sale  of radio  ment  to study  issues  arising  from private  analysis  of projects  undertaken  in politi-
spectrum  licenses  in the United  States  in  participation  in  infrastructure.  The  cally  complicated  environments.
1994.  Efficiency  of  allocation  was  the  study  was funded  by the Bank's  Research  They apply the approach  to the National
statutory  goal.  Support  Budget  under  the  research  Drainage  Program  Project,  currently  in
Much  attention  to  the  auction  came  project  "Auctions  in  Infrastructure"  the  early  stages  of  implementation  in
from its role in reducing  federal regulation  (RPO  682-58).  Copies  of  this  paper  are  Pakistan.  They  describe  risk  mitigation
of the  radio  spectrum  and  allowing  mar-  available  free from  the World Bank,  1818  strategies  that  should  be followed in deal-
ket  values,  rather  than  administrative  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  ing with political  risks  associated  with the
fiat, to determine  who would use the spec-  Please  contact  Sandra  Vivas,  room  Q7-  project.
trum  resource.  Observers  were also fasci-  005, telephone  202-458-2809,  fax 202-522-  This  paper  - a joint  product  of the
nated  by the  large  amounts  of money  in-  2029,  Internet  address  svivas  Rural  Development  Sector  Management
volved and the auction's  extensive  reliance  @worldbank.org.  The author  may be con-  Unit,  South  Asia  Region,  and  the  Rural
on Weblike  information  technology.  tacted  at  milgrom@stanford.edu.  (25  Development  Department  - is part  of a
The  first  use  of the  auction  rules  re-  pages)  larger  effort in  the  Bank  to appraise  the
sulted  in a $617 million  sale of 10 paging  National  Drainage  Program  Project  in
licenses  in July  1994.  In  the  broadband  Pakistan  and apply  the approach  to other
PCS auction, which began in December  1987.  Political Economy and  water-related  projects with institutional
1994,  99 licenses  were  sold for  about  $7  Political  Risks  of Institutional  reform  components.  Copies  of the  paper
billion. After these auctions itbecame dif-  Reform in the Water Sector  are  available free from the World Bank,
ficult  to ignore  the  tremendous  value  of  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC
the large  amounts  of spectrum  allocated  Ariel Dinar, Trichur K. Balakrishnan,  20433. Please  contact Fulvia  Toppin, room
to uses  - such  as  high-definition  televi-  and Joseph Wambia  S8-220,  telephone  202-473-0450,  fax 202-
sion-forwhich  Congress  had demanded  (September 1998)  522-1142,  Internet  address  ftoppin
no compensation.  Perceived  success  with  @worldbank.org.  The authors  may be con-
the  new  rules  inspired  similar  spectrum  An approach  combining  structured  analy-  tacted  at  adinar@worldbank.org,
auctions  in countries  around  the world.  sis  of political  economy  and  expert  opin-  tbalakrishnan@worldbank.org,  or
Milgrom  analyzes  some of the auction's  ion  is developed  and  used  to estimate  the  jwambia@worldbank.org.  (40 pages)
capabilities  and inherent  limitations,  the  political  risk  associated  with  implement-Policy Research Working Paper Series  23
1988.  The Informal  Sector,  that  firms whose cost structures  dictate
Firm  Dynamics,  and  Institutional  that  they should expand  will make the
Participation  transition  to formality as they grow.
Using  detailed  observations  from
Alec R. Levenson and William F. Maloney  Mexico, Levenson  and Maloney find their
(September  1998)  view consistent with patterns  of formal-
ity and growth of microfirms.
The high informality  and mortality and  This paper - a product of the Poverty
apparent stagnation ofdeveloping country  Reduction  and  Economic Management
microfirms are often thought to result from  Sector Unit, Latin America and the Car-
government-induced distortions in labor  or  ibbean Region - is part of a larger effort
product markets. A new approach  assumes  in the region to understand  the structure
that these informal firms have dynamics  of labor markets in developing countries.
similar tofirms in industrial countries,  and  Copies  of the paper are available free from
that formality can be thought of as the de-  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,
cision toparticipate in societal  institutions.  Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact
This leads to a substantially different vision  Tania Gomez,  room I8-102, telephone 202-
of the relationship between formality and  473-2127, fax 202-522-2119,  Internet  ad-
the natureofthe smallfirm thatemphasizes  dress  tgomez@worldbank.org.  William
the informal firm first as a normal enter-  Maloney may be contacted at  wmaloney
prise and second as informal.  @worldbank.org. (31 pages)
The informal microfirm sector is believed
to be large, accounting for 20-40 percent
of employment in many developing coun-
tries. The literature  tends to view the sec-
tor as the disadvantaged  sector of a seg-
mented labor market, as existing to evade
government regulations, or as constrained
by lack of access to government services.
Levenson and Maloney offer a unique
theoretical  framework  to analyze infor-
mality and microfirm growth behavior -
one that emphasizes the entrepreneurial
nature of informal firms and  sees infor-
mality as a secondary characteristic.
First, they assume that informal firms
in  developing countries  have  dynamics
similar to firms in industrial  countries:
entrepreneurs  have unobserved, differing
cost structures  that determine their long-
run  size and survival  - structures  that
they  can  only  discover  by  going  into
business.
Second,  informality can be thought of as
a decision to participate  in societal insti-
tutions. Access  to mechanisms that ensure
property rights, pool risk, or enforce con-
tracts  become more important  as a firm
grows, and the entrepreneur  will be will-
ing to pay for them through  "taxes" in a
way that was not the case as a small firm.
The combination of these assumptions
generates  several  of the  stylized  facts
emerging from cross-sectional data  and
identified in existing models - informal
firms tend to remain small and have high
rates of mortality, and lower productivity
- without  recourse  to  government-in-
duced distortions in labor or product mar-
kets.  Further,  the  framework  predicts